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Abstract
In my dissertation, I explore the phenomenon of workplace impostor thoughts, defined as the belief that
others hold an overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities at work. Having workplace impostor
thoughts may be far from rare. Yet, the phenomenon remains underexplored by management and
organizational behavior scholars. As a result, numerous fundamental questions remain unanswered
concerning the phenomenon’s conceptual bounds, workplace antecedents, mechanisms, and
intrapersonal as well as interpersonal consequences. For example, little consensus exists as to the
phenomenon’s precise definition. Furthermore, the work that does exist has overly favored the drawbacks
without considering its benefits. Indeed, there are hints within existing and related work that having
workplace impostor thoughts may not be as pernicious as it is portrayed. Accordingly, using both
qualitative and quantitative methods, I clarify what impostor thoughts are, where they come from, how
they affect the self, and how they affect others. I specifically focus on unearthing the benefits that
emanate from having workplace impostor thoughts with the aim of presenting a more complete picture of
this phenomenon. In Chapter 1, I develop and test a theoretical model linking workplace impostor
thoughts to two types of performance, task and interpersonal. As part of this effort, I inductively flesh out
the construct of workplace impostor thoughts using 377 news articles and blog posts as well as develop
and validate a self-report measure of impostor thoughts using seven different lab and field samples. In
Chapter 2, I explore how workplace impostor thoughts impact one’s sense of mastery at work.
Specifically, I outline a myriad of pathways—sometimes competing—that define the complicated
relationship between having workplace impostor thoughts and job mastery. I conclude each chapter by
elucidating how my theory and empirical work extend and uncover a number of surprising insights for the
literatures on workplace impostor thoughts as well as for the theories and related literatures upon which I
draw. Finally, I close by discussing how the topic of workplace impostor thoughts presents opportunities
ripe for future inquiry.
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ABSTRACT
WORKPLACE IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS:
THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION, CONSTRUCT MEASUREMENT,
AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH WORK-RELATED OUTCOMES

Basima A. Tewfik
Andrew M. Carton
Philip E. Tetlock

In my dissertation, I explore the phenomenon of workplace impostor thoughts,
defined as the belief that others hold an overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities at
work. Having workplace impostor thoughts may be far from rare. Yet, the phenomenon
remains underexplored by management and organizational behavior scholars. As a result,
numerous fundamental questions remain unanswered concerning the phenomenon’s
conceptual bounds, workplace antecedents, mechanisms, and intrapersonal as well as
interpersonal consequences. For example, little consensus exists as to the phenomenon’s
precise definition. Furthermore, the work that does exist has overly favored the
drawbacks without considering its benefits. Indeed, there are hints within existing and
related work that having workplace impostor thoughts may not be as pernicious as it is
portrayed. Accordingly, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, I clarify what
impostor thoughts are, where they come from, how they affect the self, and how they
affect others. I specifically focus on unearthing the benefits that emanate from having
workplace impostor thoughts with the aim of presenting a more complete picture of this
phenomenon. In Chapter 1, I develop and test a theoretical model linking workplace
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impostor thoughts to two types of performance, task and interpersonal. As part of this
effort, I inductively flesh out the construct of workplace impostor thoughts using 377
news articles and blog posts as well as develop and validate a self-report measure of
impostor thoughts using seven different lab and field samples. In Chapter 2, I explore
how workplace impostor thoughts impact one’s sense of mastery at work. Specifically, I
outline a myriad of pathways—sometimes competing—that define the complicated
relationship between having workplace impostor thoughts and job mastery. I conclude
each chapter by elucidating how my theory and empirical work extend and uncover a
number of surprising insights for the literatures on workplace impostor thoughts as well
as for the theories and related literatures upon which I draw. Finally, I close by discussing
how the topic of workplace impostor thoughts presents opportunities ripe for future
inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION
“People important to me think I am more capable than I think I am.”
“Others think I have more knowledge or ability than I think I do.”
“I have received greater recognition from others than I merit.”
“Other people see me more positively than my capabilities warrant.”
“I am not as qualified as others think I am.”
If you have had any of the above thoughts at work, they are likely not ones that
you have said aloud. They are likely ones that are whispered in the hushed corners of the
breakroom, in the quiet depths of your soul. Importantly, however, surveys suggest that
you are not alone. Between 40% and 70% of employees have claimed to have entertained
such thoughts at one point in their careers (Buchanan, 2006). Research in management
and psychology traces these thoughts to what is known as the impostor phenomenon (also
popularly known as the impostor syndrome). First documented in a qualitative study of
over one hundred women at a small Midwestern university, the impostor phenomenon
reflects the sustained belief that others perceive oneself more favorably than is warranted
(Clance & Imes, 1978). In the decades since this seminal work, scholars have examined
key correlates of the phenomenon (McGregor, Gee, & Posey, 2003; Sonnak & Towell,
2001), its trait antecedents (Thompson, Foreman, & Martin, 2000; Topping & Kimmel,
1985; Vergauwe, Wille, Feys, De Fruyt, & Anseel, 2015), and its consequences for
critical job attitudes and behaviors (Badawy, Gazdag, Bentley, & Brouer, 2018; Grubb &
McDowell, 2012; Vergauwe et al., 2015). Based off of this work, the predominant view
has been that experiencing the impostor phenomenon is highly pernicious. Such a
conclusion may be unsurprising given that the word “impostor” itself brings to mind
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negative connotations. Indeed, if one looks up the word “impostor” in the MerriamWebster Dictionary, one sees that it is defined as “one who assumes false identity or title
for the purpose of deception” (Impostor, 2014).
Although the predominant view paints the impostor phenomenon as detrimental,
there may be reason to believe that it may be more complex that it is currently portrayed.
This is because research on the phenomenon has been stymied theoretically,
phenomenologically, and empirically. Theoretically, despite the impostor phenomenon’s
relevance to the workplace, few scholars have examined the phenomenon’s work-related
outcomes, and those who have, have motivated their investigations by arguing that it is
precisely because it is dysfunctional that more research within organizational contexts is
needed (Vergauwe et al., 2015). For example, to date, consideration of work-related
behavioral outcomes has been limited to examining the phenomenon’s negative direct
effect on organizational citizenship behaviors (Vergauwe et al., 2015) and its conditional
negative effect on performance in student samples (Badawy et al., 2018). Yet, there are
hints within existing and related work that the phenomenon may have unacknowledged
bright sides. For example, although seminal work suggested that the phenomenon was
harmful, scholars observed this phenomenon among those who were flourishing, not
those who were floundering at work (Clance & Imes, 1978).
Phenomenologically, little consensus exists as to the phenomenon’s precise
definition. Some have defined the phenomenon at a high-level as the “internal experience
of intellectual phoniness” (Clance & O’Toole, 1987: 51). Others have attempted to
unpack the phenomenon, characterizing it through five additional facets including
external attributions of success, low self-efficacy, fear of negative evaluation, fear of
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being exposed as incompetent, and an inability to enjoy one’s successes (September,
McCarrey, Baranowsky, Parent, & Schindler, 2001). Empirically, used most often in
extant research is a problematic operationalization of the phenomenon: the 20-item
Impostor Phenomenon scale (Clance, 1985). Although this scale has demonstrated some
adequate convergent and discriminant validity with regards to related constructs
(Chrisman, Pieper, Clance, Holland, & Glickauf-Hughes, 1995), confirmatory factor
analyses have signaled that the scale may be unsound (French, Ullrich-French, &
Follman, 2008). Such a weak operationalization of the impostor phenomenon is
unfortunate because flawed measures “threaten our understanding of organizational
phenomena” (Hinkin, 1998: 104).
Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to advance research on this phenomenon,
theoretically, phenomenologically, and empirically. To do so, I introduce the construct of
workplace impostor thoughts. Workplace impostor thoughts captures the belief that
others hold an overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities at work. I explore this
construct in a myriad of organizational settings from physicians-in-training to employees
at an investment solutions firm to Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets. I pay close
attention to developing and testing theoretical models that privilege the phenomenon’s
unexpected bright sides, thereby challenging prevailing wisdom. In Chapter 1, I develop
and test a theoretical model of workplace impostor thoughts that not only delineates how
and for whom impostor thoughts may lead to upsides for job performance, but also
articulates from where such thoughts emerge. As part of this effort, I inductively flesh out
the construct of workplace impostor thoughts using 377 news articles and blog posts as
well as develop and validate a self-report measure of impostor thoughts using seven
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different lab and field samples. In Chapter 2, I explore for whom, how, and through what
mechanisms workplace impostor thoughts influence one’s sense of mastery at work. I
find that workplace impostor thoughts may positively impact mastery serially through a
fear of being found out and introjected motivation as well as indirectly though introjected
motivation conditional on having a growth mindset. In contrast, I find evidence only for
one pathway by which workplace impostor thoughts may negatively impact mastery—
indirectly through a fear of being found out.
The results of this dissertation offer three types of contributions. Theoretically, I
challenge the prevailing wisdom that entertaining workplace impostor thoughts is highly
detrimental. I show that entertaining workplace impostor thoughts may not only be
advantageous for one’s task and interpersonal performance, but also for developing
mastery at work—particularly if one has a growth mindset or helps others at work. In
doing so, I expand the set of work-related outcomes considered, answering calls issued
by scholars for greater research around this phenomenon in organizational settings
(Vergauwe et al., 2015). Phenomenologically, I offer a parsimonious, non-tautological
definition that articulates the core elements of the phenomenon as well as delineates the
contextual conditions that define the scope of the construct. Finally, empirically, I
develop a psychometrically valid measure of workplace impostor thoughts that sets the
stage for future rigorous investigations of the phenomenon. Taken together, this
dissertation advances our understanding of the prevalent, but underexplored,
phenomenon of workplace impostor thoughts, clarifying what it is, where it comes from,
how it affects the self, and how it affects others at work.
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CHAPTER 1
NOT AS SMART AS OTHERS SEEM TO THINK?
HOW WORKPLACE IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS MAY UNEXPECTEDLY
BENEFIT WORK PERFORMANCE

ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen a surge in interest in a phenomenon popularly known as the
impostor syndrome. The majority of existing theory and empirical work has focused on
the drawbacks of the syndrome. Yet, there are hints that the phenomenon may have
benefits. These benefits, however, may be obscured due to current conceptualizations of
the phenomenon as an individual difference that makes it virtually indistinguishable from
neuroticism, low self-efficacy, and maladaptive perfectionism. In this paper, I seek to
rebalance the conversation around the phenomenon by introducing the construct of
workplace impostor thoughts, which is defined as the belief that others may overestimate
one’s talent or abilities at work. Drawing on theories of resource allocation and identity, I
hypothesize relationships between impostor thoughts and task performance as well as
interpersonal performance. After developing and validating a self-report measure of
impostor thoughts using seven lab and field samples, I test my hypotheses across two
studies: a field study of physicians-in-training and a field study of employees at an
investment solutions firm. I find mixed results regarding the relationship between
impostor thoughts and task performance. However, in line with what I hypothesize, I find
that having impostor thoughts is positively associated with interpersonal performance,
and that this relationship is stronger for males than for females. I further find evidence
that impostor thoughts stem from facing unfamiliar role responsibilities. Taken together,
my results suggest that entertaining impostor thoughts at work may not necessarily lead
to poorer task performance. Instead, such thoughts may sometimes encourage employees
to prove themselves interpersonally.
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Recent years have seen a surge in interest in a phenomenon popularly known as
the impostor syndrome among organizational scholars, business thought leaders, and
career professionals alike (e.g., McDowell, Boyd, & Bowler, 2007; Molinsky, 2016;
Richards, 2015). In contemporary discourse, impostor syndrome reflects the sustained
belief that others perceive oneself more favorably than is warranted (Hutchins, Penney, &
Sublett, 2018; Leary, Patton, Orlando, & Wagoner Funk, 2000). Individuals who
experience this syndrome (“impostors”) are considered to be those who persistently think
to themselves, “I am not as qualified as others think I am” or “Other people see me more
positively than my capabilities warrant.” Whereas the phenomenon has a history in
psychology and the popular press dating back to the late 1970’s (Clance & Imes, 1978),
management scholars have only recently begun to examine the phenomenon in the
context of work organizations. This nascent but growing stream of research has shown
that the syndrome is negatively related to organizational citizenship behaviors and job
satisfaction (Grubb & McDowell, 2012; Vergauwe et al., 2015) as well as self-efficacy
and organizational support (McDowell, Grubb, & Geho, 2015). As a result, the emerging
conclusion is that experiencing impostor syndrome at work is uniformly harmful. Indeed,
it is largely because of the phenomenon’s “dysfunctional nature” that organizational
scholars have called for greater research on this phenomenon (e.g., Vergauwe et al.,
2015: 579).
Although such calls have importantly spurred research within organizations (e.g.,
Hutchins et al., 2018; Neureiter & Traut-Mattausch, 2016), their normative nature has
introduced the risk that emerging scholarship has overwhelmingly privileged the
drawbacks of the phenomenon without considering its benefits. Compounding this risk
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are two factors. First, there are hints within original theorizing on the phenomenon as
well as research emanating from related literatures that the phenomenon may have
upsides. For example, although seminal work suggested that the phenomenon was
detrimental, these same researchers found that it was particularly prevalent among those
who were high-achieving as opposed to those who were struggling at work (Clance &
Imes, 1978). Similarly, to the extent that the phenomenon captures the notion that an
individual perceives that others have higher expectations of him or her, research on the
Pygmalion effect would suggest that individuals “suffering” from this phenomenon may
over time accrue benefits in the form of increased learning and higher performance
(Eden, 1990; McNatt, 2000; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Second, and relatedly, these
benefits may not have been observed because underlying most extant research is a
problematic conceptualization of the phenomenon that makes it nearly indistinguishable
from a combination of low self-efficacy, maladaptive perfectionism, and neuroticism
(French et al., 2008; Vergauwe et al., 2015). As such, conclusions arising from work on
the impostor syndrome may be the consequence of a lack of construct clarity rather than
sound theorizing (Suddaby, 2010).
Accordingly, to examine the possibility that the phenomenon may have
unexplored benefits, I revisit assumptions underlying existing conceptualizations and
operationalizations of the phenomenon. In doing so, I introduce the construct of
workplace impostor thoughts. Defined as the belief that others hold an overly positive
view of one’s talent or abilities at work, the construct of workplace impostor thoughts
pays homage to original theorizing that highlighted the phenomenon’s state-like qualities
(see Clance & Imes, 1978). Such a conceptualization is consistent with surveys that
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suggest that between 40% and 70% of employees have entertained impostor thoughts at
one point in their careers (Buchanan, 2006). After defining workplace impostor thoughts,
I then explore the relationship between such thoughts and individual job performance,
which includes task and interpersonal performance. In developing a model linking
impostor thoughts to performance, I integrate identity theories including self-discrepancy
and self-affirmation theories with resource allocations theories (Higgins, 1987; Kanfer &
Ackerman, 1989; Steele, 1988). Such theories are particularly apt because they allow me
to understand how what one thinks of one’s abilities impacts how one allocates one’s
resources to perform at work. I test my hypotheses across two samples in the field: a
sample of physicians and a sample of employees at an investment solutions firm.
Among its theoretical contributions, this investigation has important implications
primarily for the literatures on the impostor phenomenon and identity at work more
broadly. First and foremost, I challenge prevailing wisdom that having impostor thoughts
at work is uniformly detrimental, thereby redirecting the literature. In detail, I not only
identify performance benefits emanating from impostor thoughts, but I also qualify for
whom these performance benefits are likely to arise. Second, I extend original theorizing
on the phenomenon by introducing the construct of workplace impostor thoughts and
identify a key antecedent: facing unfamiliar role responsibilities. In this way, potentially
anyone can entertain impostor thoughts. Although original theorizing suggested that the
impostor phenomenon was in part situationally driven (Clance & Imes, 1978), most
extant theory has conceptualized the phenomenon as an individual difference,
categorizing individuals as either impostors or non-impostors (e.g., Ferrari, 2005; Sonnak
& Towell, 2001; Thompson et al., 2000). Third, I contribute to research on identity by
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highlighting the importance of examining self-concept constructs that capture the
complex interplay between how employees see themselves as well as how they believe
others see them. Such constructs are increasingly important as work becomes more and
more interdependent (Barley, Bechky, & Milliken, 2017).
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTRUCT OF IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS
Defining Workplace Impostor Thoughts
The phenomenon of impostor thoughts can be traced back to the domain of
clinical psychology in the late 1970s (Clance & Imes, 1978). Because of its history, it
may be tempting to think that the phenomenon is clearly understood. However, this is not
the case. The construct has instead suffered from a proliferation of construct definitions
and subsequent weak measures, hampering research on the phenomenon (French et al.,
2008; Fujie, 2010; Sakulku & Alexander, 2011). As an illustration, extant
conceptualizations have made it nearly indistinguishable from low self-efficacy, high
neuroticism, and maladaptive perfectionism (Vergauwe et al., 2015). Yet, in spite of the
multitude of definitions, a consistent implicit or explicit theme across most influential
conceptualizations of this phenomenon is a belief that others have overestimated one’s
abilities or talent (Clance & O’Toole, 1987; Harvey & Katz, 1985; September et al.,
2001). As such, in this work, I define the phenomenon as the belief that others have an
overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities. Thus, rather than referring to the
construct as the impostor phenomenon, which is often invoked in the psychological and
nascent organizational behavior literature (e.g., Vergauwe et al., 2015), or the impostor
syndrome, which is the term most often used in popular press (e.g., Anderson, 2016), I
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use the term workplace impostor thoughts, or impostor thoughts for short. In this way, the
term reflects the phenomenon’s cognitive underpinnings.
To fully clarify the nature of impostor thoughts, four additional definitional
elements warrant discussion. First, unlike prior refinement of the construct which has
occurred in non-work domains, I extend the impostor thoughts construct to the work
domain, following scholars who have made such strides with other constructs that have
originated outside the work domain (e.g., Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002; Pierce,
Gardner, Cummings, & Dunham, 1989). As such, the construct of impostor thoughts
captures a discrepancy between two representations of the self at work: what one thinks
of one’s abilities at work and what one thinks others think of one’s abilities at work. Such
a notion of impostor thoughts as a role-based construct is consistent with early definitions
of the construct (see Harvey & Katz, 1985). Second, although the word impostor is used
in the construct’s terminology, the active intent to deceive is not a requisite component.
As I elaborate in my theorizing below, those who have impostor thoughts are subject to
experiencing a great deal of threat and uncertainty because such thoughts bring to light
that there is a discrepancy between how one sees oneself and how others see oneself
(Higgins, 1987). Because individuals seek to reduce threat and uncertainty (Festinger,
1957; Higgins, 1987), it would be misleading to believe that individuals willingly
entertain impostor thoughts. Rather, the extent to which individuals experience these
thoughts is outside of their control, and therefore is largely unintentional.
Third, the locus of miscalibration regarding one’s abilities lies within the
individual having impostor thoughts. That is, the construct does not assume that an actual
discrepancy exists between one’s perception and others’ perceptions of one’s abilities.
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Individuals need only perceive that a discrepancy exists for them to hold impostor
thoughts. Finally, it is worth noting that although many conceptualizations categorize
individuals as either impostors or not, the construct is not a trait (Leary et al., 2000;
McElwee & Yurak, 2010). Impostor thoughts can instead be thought to emerge as a result
of situational factors (Harvey & Katz, 1985; McElwee & Yurak, 2010). In my theorizing
below, I consider one such possible situational antecedent—unfamiliar role
responsibilities—due to the centrality of one’s organizational role for those who hold
impostor thoughts.
Impostor Thoughts and Related Constructs
My focus on the interplay between one’s perceptions that others have of one at
work as well as one’s own perceptions of oneself at work distinguishes impostor thoughts
from a number of potentially related constructs. These concepts include organizationbased self-esteem (OBSE), role self-efficacy, core self-evaluations (CSE), role-based
image discrepancies, and interpersonal congruence. Table 1 summarizes the conceptual
differences between these constructs and the construct of impostor thoughts. At a highlevel, largely missing from this litany of constructs is the incorporation of an individual’s
beliefs about what others think of his or her competence. For role-based image
discrepancies and interpersonal congruence, differences can be found in the direction of
the discrepancy between one’s perception and others’ perceptions. For example, those
who perceive role-based image discrepancies are those who believe that others hold their
role in lesser regard than they themselves hold their own role (Vough, Cardador, Bednar,
Dane, & Pratt, 2013). In contrast, those who are high in impostor thoughts believe that
others hold their abilities in higher regard than they themselves believe is merited.
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----Insert Table 1 Here---A MODEL LINKING WORKPLACE IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS TO
PERFORMANCE
As noted at the outset of this article, the central aim of this investigation is to
develop a model linking impostor thoughts to job performance. Job performance captures
not only those behaviors that contribute to organizational effectiveness because they
involve proficiently executing tasks, but it also captures those behaviors that contribute to
organizational effectiveness because they involve cooperating with or helping others
(Campbell, 1990; Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007; Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996).
Whereas a variety of labels have been applied to capture these sets of performance
behaviors, common labels include task performance and interpersonal performance,
respectively (Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005; Bons & Fiedler, 1976; Motowidlo, Packard,
& Manning, 1986; Staw & Barsade, 1993; Van Iddekinge, Putka, & Campbell, 2011). To
understand how impostor thoughts impact task and interpersonal performance, I integrate
identity theories including self-discrepancy and self-affirmation theories with resource
allocations theories (Higgins, 1987; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Steele, 1988). Together,
these theories offer a platform to understand how the thoughts employees hold about their
abilities impact the manner by which these employees allocate their resources in order to
perform at work. In my theorizing below, I not only consider the consequences of
impostor thoughts, but I also integrate identity theories and resource allocation theories to
elucidate an antecedent to such thoughts. See Figure 1 for the full theoretical model.
----Insert Figure 1 Here----
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Impostor Thoughts and Task Performance
Task performance reflects the extent to which an employee meets the formal
requirements of his or her role (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Campbell, McCloy, Oppler,
& Sager, 1993; Griffin et al., 2007). In comparison to other dimensions of individual job
performance, task performance tends to be the typical focus of most research on job
performance (Griffin et al., 2007). This type of performance is often well-defined and
formalized within job descriptions, consisting of those behaviors that contribute to the
“technical core” of the organization (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). Because “the major
source of variation in task performance is the proficiency with which a person can carry
out task activities” (Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994: 476), this type of performance is
largely determined by the attention, effort, and emotional energy that an employee invests
to meet his or her role responsibilities (Crawford, LePine, & Rich, 2010). In other words,
the extent to which an employee invests his or her cognitive, physical, and emotional
resources differentiates high-performing employees from their low-performing peers.
On one hand, impostor thoughts should be positively related to task performance
because such thoughts may be motivational in nature. By definition, impostor thoughts
make salient two conflicting representations of the self—a representation that involves
how one thinks others see one’s abilities at work and a second that involves how one
thinks about one’s own abilities at work. Theories such as self-discrepancy theory
(Higgins, 1987), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and balance theory
(Heider, 1958) have long suggested that such discrepancies inspire efforts to reduce the
discrepancy, or, in other words, spark motivation. In fact, as Festinger (1957: 3) stated, a
discrepancy in cognitions can be “a motivating factor in its own right.” With increased
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motivation, individuals may direct their resources and efforts in a sustained fashion
towards the task at hand (Bandura, 1977, 1982; Ericsson, 2008; Ericsson, Krampe, &
Tesch-Römer, 1993). In turn, with greater resources directed towards the task, task
performance should increase. This link between increased resources directed towards a
task and higher task performance is empirically well-established in existing literatures.
For example, research on goal-setting has found that when individuals set goals around
task performance, they allocate greater attention and effort which, in turn, results in
higher performance (Locke, 1996; Locke & Latham, 1984). Similarly, research on the
Pygmalion effect suggests that when individuals perceive that others have higher
expectations of their abilities than they themselves do, they increase their efforts at work,
which results in greater learning and greater performance (Eden, 1988; Eden, 1990;
McNatt, 2000). Drawing on this work, I therefore pose the following hypothesis between
impostor thoughts and task performance.
Hypothesis 1a: Having impostor thoughts is positively associated with task
performance.
On the other hand, there is also support that impostor thoughts should be
negatively related to task performance. Whereas the aforementioned theories—selfdiscrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and
balance theory (Heider, 1958)—indicate that discrepancies can be motivational, these
same theories have also long suggested that such discrepancies trigger emotional
discomfort. Managing one’s emotional discomfort at work requires marshaling one’s
resources (Grandey, 2000). This can be problematic for task performance. Because
resources can be limited (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), greater resources directed towards
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monitoring and managing one’s inner state likely mean fewer resources directed towards
the task. Indeed, empirical evidence from at least two different literatures indicates that,
by and large, directing one’s resources inwards to resolve or make sense of selfdiscrepancies impedes task performance. For example, research on “choking under
pressure” has found that when individuals are made to be more self-aware, the quality of
their individual performance suffers. This is because self-awareness increases the amount
of attention paid to the self, which distracts even the most skilled individuals from the
task at hand (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997). As
another illustration, research on feedback suggests that when employees receive feedback
that makes salient a discrepancy between how one sees oneself and how others see
oneself, individuals may shift their resources from the task to the self, impairing
subsequent task performance (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Based off of this theory and
empirical work, I therefore also pose a competing hypothesis to the one above.
Hypothesis 1b: Having impostor thoughts is negatively associated with task
performance.
Impostor Thoughts and Interpersonal Performance
In contrast to the competing relationships hypothesized between impostor
thoughts and task performance, I expect impostor thoughts to be positively associated
with interpersonal performance. Interpersonal performance captures a broader set of
behaviors than task performance that are less prescribed and more discretionary (Van
Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996). Because interpersonal performance behaviors are more
discretionary, they are largely a product of an employee’s motivation to engage in such
behaviors (Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994). Example interpersonal performance
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behaviors include “(a) volunteering to carry out task activities that are not formally part
of the job; (b) persisting with extra enthusiasm when necessary to complete own task
activities successfully; (c) helping and cooperating with others; (d) following
organizational rules and procedures even when it is personally inconvenient; and (e)
endorsing, supporting, and defending organizational objectives” (Motowidlo & Van
Scotter, 1994: 476). In this manner, interpersonal performance subsumes those behaviors
associated with related concepts such as prosocial behavior, extrarole behavior, and
organizational citizenship behaviors.
Impostor thoughts should be positively associated with interpersonal performance
because it allows one to minimize threat and uncertainty arising from impostor thoughts
through self-affirmation. Because impostor thoughts signal that one perceives that others
have overestimated one’s talent or abilities at work, such thoughts intimate that one may
be unjustly benefitting, given that being overestimated at work may carry with it
advantages including, for example, increased influence over others (Birnbaum & Stegner,
1979; French & Raven, 1959). This realization can threaten one’s self-integrity, or one’s
sense that one is a good person (Steele, 1988). This is because it introduces the possibility
that the world that one lives in may not necessarily be fair, or, in other words, that one
may be getting more than what one deserves (Lerner & Miller, 1978). When an
individual’s self-integrity is threatened, individuals respond by affirming oneself on a
dimension other than the one that is threatened (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988).
Affirming oneself on another valued dimension mitigates threat to one’s self-integrity
because it reminds oneself that one’s self-integrity is larger than one’s worth on a
particular dimension: “When global perceptions of self-integrity are affirmed, otherwise
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threatening events or information lose their self-threatening capacity because the
individual can view them within a broader, larger view of the self” (Sherman & Cohen,
2006: 189).
In the case of an employee’s impostor thoughts, the domain of threat stems from
one’s own perceptions of one’s competence at work. That is, individuals who are high in
impostor thoughts believe that they may be lower in competence than what they believe
others perceive. As such, to minimize threats to their self-integrity, they must self-affirm
on a dimension other than competence. One possible candidate is the dimension of
warmth, which captures judgments of liking and friendliness (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick,
2007). Indeed, warmth is a dominant dimension along which individuals form
impressions of others, and together, with competence, “account[s] almost entirely for
how people characterize others” (Fiske et al., 2007: 77). Affirming along the dimension
of warmth necessarily entails displaying behaviors that elicit attributions of friendliness,
helpfulness, and sincerity. Curiously, such behaviors are those same behaviors that
underlie interpersonal performance behaviors given that interpersonal performance
behaviors are those that involve supporting, helping, and cooperating with others (Van
Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996). Consequently, because impostor thoughts may encourage
individuals to self-affirm on the dimension of warmth, individuals who are high in
impostor thoughts may display higher interpersonal performance behaviors.
Hypothesis 2: Having impostor thoughts is positively associated with
interpersonal performance.
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The Moderating Role of Gender
Although I propose that there should be a positive relationship between impostor
thoughts and interpersonal performance, this relationship is likely to be weaker for some
individuals as compared to others. This is because displaying interpersonal performance
behaviors to compensate for one’s impostor thoughts carries with it two assumptions.
First, it assumes that an individual has the capacity to display additional interpersonal
performance behaviors. That is, it assumes that individuals are not already displaying
high levels of interpersonal performance behaviors such that an increase is possible.
Second, it assumes that if an individual were to display such behavior, others would
encode it as such. That is, it assumes that engaging in the high-warmth behaviors
associated with interpersonal performance would translate into higher evaluations of
interpersonal performance from others. Importantly, meeting these two assumptions may
be more difficult for females as compared to males for two reasons.
First, research suggests that females already perform a high-level of interpersonal
performance behaviors. This is because females, as compared to males, are both asked to
engage in such behaviors more and are also more willing to acquiesce to such asks
(Babcock, Recalde, & Vesterlund, 2017a; Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, & Weingart,
2017b). Indeed, across six studies including a field study of 3271 academics at a large
public university, Babcock and colleagues (2017b) found that females spent a
disproportionate amount of their time in comparison to males on tasks that contribute to
organizational effectiveness through cooperation and helpfulness, thereby engaging in
greater interpersonal performance behaviors. This difference was explained by the fact
that females volunteered to engage in such behaviors (e.g., more females volunteered to
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serve on the faculty senate) and by the fact that others were more likely to ask females for
help or cooperation (Babcock et al., 2017b). In contrast, males were less likely to engage
in such behaviors. As such, in comparison to females who already display high levels of
interpersonal performance behaviors, males may have more “room” to respond to their
impostor thoughts by compensating with higher interpersonal performance behaviors. Put
simply, then, gender may disrupt the relationship between impostor thoughts and
interpersonal performance because the starting levels of interpersonal performance
behaviors differ by gender.
Second, even if females have the capacity to display additional interpersonal
performance behaviors, it is likely that they may not receive credit for engaging in these
types of behaviors. This is because displaying high-warmth behaviors associated with
interpersonal performance is often not evaluated in the same way for females as it is for
males (Heilman & Chen, 2005). When females engage in interpersonal performance
behaviors, such behaviors are perceived as consistent with the female stereotype, and are
thus not noteworthy (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001). However, when males
engage in such interpersonal performance behaviors, such behaviors may serve as a
positive expectancy violation (Prentice & Carranza, 2002, 2004). In other words, because
males are not expected to engage in such behaviors, but females are, males benefit from
displaying the opposite gender’s prescriptive traits of helpfulness and cooperation
(Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987; Prentice & Carranza, 2002, 2004). Indeed, across two
experiments, Heilman and Chen (2005) found that engaging in the same degree of
altruistic citizenship behaviors enhanced males’ performance evaluations and reward
recommendations but did not affect those of females. In other words, they found evidence
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of rating biases. As such, gender may disrupt the relationship between impostor thoughts
and interpersonal performance because individuals react differently to interpersonal
performance behaviors based on the gender of the individual performing the behavior.
Tying the above theorizing together, I argue the following:
Hypothesis 3: Gender moderates the positive relationship between impostor
thoughts and interpersonal performance such that the relationship is stronger for
males than for females.
The Antecedent of Unfamiliar Role Responsibilities
Having articulated the performance consequences of impostor thoughts and
potential boundary conditions, I conclude my theorizing by focusing on potential
antecedents to impostor thoughts. Although having impostor thoughts likely has many
antecedents, factors particular to the role one holds likely engender impostor thoughts
because impostor thoughts concern one’s abilities to perform one’s role (Sluss, van Dick,
& Thompson, 2011). Remaining within the theoretical framework of identity, I
specifically suggest that facing unfamiliar role responsibilities, which are new or different
tasks prescribed by one’s role (Dragoni, Tesluk, Russell, & Oh, 2009), may be one such
factor. Indeed, how one thinks about what one does at work can be a salient part of one’s
identity (Sluss et al., 2011). Examples of unfamiliar role responsibilities abound. For
example, an employee who has been asked to lead a project team for the first time can be
said to be facing unfamiliar role responsibilities. Similarly, a professor who has been
approached by a student for formal mentorship when he or she has never advised before
can also be thought to be facing unfamiliar role responsibilities. Notably, as illustrated in
these two examples, unfamiliar role responsibilities need not only arise when an
individual experiences an explicit role change such as a promotion, demotion, or a job
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rotation. This is because scholars embracing a role making perspective have long
acknowledged that roles are cognitively constructed such that role responsibilities are
constantly renegotiated between employees and their supervisors (e.g., Graen, 1976;
Morrison, 1994).
Facing unfamiliar role responsibilities likely engenders impostor thoughts because
it introduces uncertainty for an individual while simultaneously providing an implicit
assumption that others are not uncertain about an individual’s ability to perform. When
individuals face unfamiliar role responsibilities, individuals are likely to experience
uncertainty around their ability to perform. This is because they have never performed
these responsibilities before and therefore may not be sure if the skills they have
developed when executing past responsibilities are transferrable. Indeed, in a longitudinal
study of 171 mental health scientists, Adkins (1995) theorized that those scientists who
faced work responsibilities that were consistent, as opposed to inconsistent, with their
prior work experience were likely to be more confident about their ability to perform
their responsibilities. This was because responsibilities that were consistent with prior
work experience were more familiar. Accordingly, facing unfamiliar role responsibilities
breeds uncertainty. However, at the same time, when individuals face unfamiliar role
responsibilities, these individuals are likely to infer that others do not share this same
sense of uncertainty around their ability to perform. In organizations, role responsibilities
are typically assigned by a higher-status individual in an organization (Dragoni et al.,
2009). Because assigned work must get done for an organization to function (Griffin et
al., 2007), supervisors are unlikely to assign responsibilities to those who they think
cannot perform. Thus, individuals are likely to infer that others see them as capable of
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performing assigned responsibilities. Together, this combination between an individual’s
uncertainty and his or her supervisor’s certainty results in a discrepancy where an
individual may perceive his or her abilities as being lower than what he or she believes
others perceive. In other words, unfamiliar role responsibilities result in individuals
believing that others have overestimated their abilities, which, by definition, reflects
impostor thoughts.
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that there may indeed be a positive
association between unfamiliar role responsibilities and impostor thoughts. For example,
in a qualitative study of management journal editors with differing levels of role tenure,
Corley and Schinoff (2017) found that editors at the beginning of their tenure were more
likely to think that manuscript authors believed the editors had more requisite editorial
expertise than they thought they had. This was because editors recognized that the role
responsibilities they had as editors differed drastically from their previously-held
responsibilities as a reviewer (Corley & Schinoff, 2017). In other words, editors
entertained impostor-like thoughts when faced with unfamiliar responsibilities. Similarly,
in a mixed-methods study of managers of for-profit and non-profit organizations, DeRue
and Wellman (2009) indicated that unfamiliar role responsibilities—and developmental
job experiences more broadly—bred anxieties related to performance failure and
evaluation. Given that managers were assigned to these responsibilities by others, such
anxieties implied that managers perhaps thought others were potentially overestimating
their abilities. Building off of this work, I put forth the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Facing unfamiliar role responsibilities is positively associated with
having impostor thoughts.
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OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
I tested my hypotheses across two studies in the field. In Study 1, which featured
a sample of physicians-in-training, I explored Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2, which concerned
the performance consequences of having impostor thoughts. In Study 2, which involved a
sample of employees at an investment solutions firm, I explored the full theoretical
model, including boundary conditions around performance consequences (Hypothesis 3)
and the proposed antecedent (Hypothesis 4).
STUDY 1
Participants and Materials
In Study 1, which involved a time-lagged design, I collected data from
physicians-in-training at the Perelman School of Medicine at the University of
Pennsylvania. Physicians were two months away from starting their clinical rotations and
were recruited via email with the assistance of employees and faculty at the Perelman
School of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania. Specifically, the email invited
physicians to participate in a one-hour long study. Physicians were told that, as part of the
study, they would be asked to partake in a patient interaction that would allow
researchers to assess physicians’ clinical skills. In order to incentivize participation,
physicians were offered compensation in the amount of $20 and an opportunity to receive
$100 via a raffle. Forty-five out of 161 physicians opted into the study (a response rate of
28%). Fifty-three percent of the sample was male, and 36% identified as Caucasian, 2%
identified as Hispanic, 36% identified as Asian-American, 9% identified as AfricanAmerican, and 2% identified as other. Note that 7 out of the 45 (16%) physicians
identified with more than one ethnicity. Their average age was 24.5 years (SD = 2.6).
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Given that the study was intended to reflect a real-world physician-patient
interaction, I also recruited patients, who were blind to the hypotheses of the study as
well as any information on the physicians with whom they interacted. Patients in this
study were Standardized Patient actors (SPs), members of the community who
supplemented their income by assisting in training individuals who were at various stages
in their medical careers. SPs were recruited with the following casting criteria: males
under the age of 50 years old. Nine SPs participated. They had an average age of 31.4
years (SD = 4.2). All but two identified as Caucasian. The key advantage of using SPs
was that SPs offered a standardized, controlled experience for physicians such that
interactions were identical, no matter the specific actor. To ensure there were minimal
differences across physician-patient interactions, SPs underwent an extensive training on
the medical case that they were expected to act out. Specifically, SPs were instructed to
act as if they had symptoms consistent with a sexually transmitted illness. This case was
selected because it was challenging both from a proficiency as well as an interpersonal
standpoint.
Procedure
Approximately one week before the physician-patient interaction (Time 1),
physicians completed an electronic survey that contained the measure for impostor
thoughts as well as demographic variables. During the day of the interaction, physicians
participated in a 35-minute encounter with a SP. Physicians were instructed to collect the
SP’s history and offer a diagnosis and treatment plan. SPs, blind to study hypotheses and
data on physicians, then completed task and interpersonal performance ratings for each of
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the physicians with whom they interacted. SPs all went through a training on how to
complete these ratings. After being paid and debriefed, physicians were dismissed.
Measures
Unless otherwise noted, respondents used a seven-point Likert scale ranging from
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree when responding to the items below.
Impostor thoughts (Time 1). I measured impostor thoughts using a six-point
frequency scale ranging from 1 = never to 6 = very frequently. Physicians were presented
with the stem, “During my medical training, I have thought that…,” followed by five
items: “People important to me think I am more capable than I think I am,” “Others think
I have more knowledge or ability than I think I do,” “Other people see me more
positively than my capabilities warrant,” “I have received greater recognition from others
than I merit,” and “I am not as qualified as others think I am” (α = .92). I used seven
additional lab and field samples to develop and validate a self-report measure of impostor
thoughts following recommendations from Hinkin (1998) and DeVellis (1991). See
Appendix A for a description of the construct validation process, which was comprised of
item generation, questionnaire administration, item reduction, confirmatory factor
analysis, as well as convergent and discriminant validity testing.
Task performance (Time 2). To measure task performance, I relied on three
different operationalizations. First, SPs offered ratings of task performance using the
Griffin, Neal, and Parker (2007) proficiency scale. After the stem, “During the
interaction,” SPs saw three items: (1) “This physician carried out his / her work activities,
tasks, and responsibilities well,” (2) “This physician completed his / her work activities,
tasks, and responsibilities,” and (3) “This physician ensured his / her work activities,
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tasks, and responsibilities were completed properly” (α = .76). Second, task performance
was evaluated by the accuracy of the diagnosis. If the correct sexually transmitted illness
was ascertained, physicians were given a score of “1;” otherwise, they received a score of
“0.” Finally, task performance was evaluated by the accuracy of the treatment plan. Two
medical experts at the Perelman School of Medicine worked together to assign a score of
“1” if they deemed the treatment plan to be accurate, “0” otherwise.
Interpersonal performance (Time 2). To measure interpersonal performance, I
relied on the interpersonal skills inventory developed by the Perelman School of
Medicine for this explicit purpose. Using a four-point scale ranging from 1 = poor to 4 =
very good, SPs rated physicians along six skills: eliciting information, listening, giving
information, respectfulness, empathy, and professionalism (α = .76). To ensure these six
skills loaded together onto a single higher-order factor of interpersonal performance, I ran
an exploratory factor analysis using principal components with direct oblimin rotation.
Results revealed that items loaded onto a single factor (each with loadings greater than
.56).
Control variable (Time 1). When determining which control variables to include
in my analyses, I statistically accounted for factors that were likely to be correlated with
my independent variable of interest, impostor thoughts, as well as with one or both of my
dependent variables of interest, task and interpersonal performance. For example,
physician ability likely correlated with both impostor thoughts as well as task
performance. To control for ability, I gathered physicians-in-training’s Medical College
Admission Test (MCAT) scores. Forty-one out of 45 physicians provided their scores. At
the time of data collection, MCAT scores could range from 3-45, with a score of 25
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th

signifying that the student was in the 50 percentile. Below I report analyses with and
without this control variable.
Analyses and Results
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study
variables. Hypothesis 1a predicted that impostor thoughts would be positively related to
task performance while Hypothesis 1b predicted that impostor thoughts would be
negatively related to task performance. As can be seen in Table 3a, when considering
accuracy of the diagnosis as a measure of task performance using binary logistic
regression, I did not find a significant relationship between impostor thoughts and task
performance (B = -.46, SE(B) = .30, Exp(B) = .63, Wald(df=1) = 2.31, n.s.). Similarly,
when considering accuracy of the treatment plan as a measure of task performance using
binary logistic regression, I did not find a significant relationship between impostor
thoughts and task performance (B = .004, SE(B) = .49, Exp(B) = 1.00, Wald(df=1) = 0.00,
n.s.).
----Insert Tables 2, 3a, and 3b Here---Finally, I examined Hypotheses 1a and 1b by considering SP-rated task
performance. Whereas diagnosis and treatment plan were binary variables necessitating
the use of binary logistic regression, SP-rated task performance potentially necessitated
the use of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000)
because physician ratings were nested within SPs. To assess whether HLM was needed, I
determined the between- and within-variance (the SP rater and physician variance,
respectively) by running a null model in multilevel analyses from which I calculated the
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). Variance decomposition analyses revealed that
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25% of the variance was accounted for by the SP rater; 75% of the variance was
accounted for by the physician. Because the between-entity (SP rater) variance estimate
was significant (p <.001), and a substantial portion of the total variance was attributable
to the between-entity factor, I deemed HLM to be suitable when testing Hypotheses 1a
and 1b with SP-rated task performance. In contrast to what was hypothesized in
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, and, as can be seen in Table 3c, having impostor thoughts was not
significantly related to task performance (estimate= .09, SE= .11, n.s.). When controlling
for MCAT scores as can be seen in Table 3b, the pattern of results remained the same
across all operationalizations of task performance.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that impostor thoughts would be positively related to
interpersonal performance. Because physician ratings of interpersonal performance were
nested within SPs, I again assessed whether HLM was needed. After running a null
model in multilevel analyses, I found that 27% of the variance was accounted for by the
SP rater; 73% of the variance was accounted for by the physician (p <.001). As such, I
tested Hypothesis 2 using HLM as can be seen in Tables 4a and 4b. In support of
Hypothesis 2, impostor thoughts was significantly positively associated with
interpersonal performance (estimate= .12, SE= .05, p <.05). Furthermore, this result held
when controlling for physician MCAT scores (estimate= .11, SE= .05, p <.05), as can be
seen in Table 4b.
----Insert Tables 4a and 4b about here---Discussion
The results from Study 1 provided support for Hypothesis 2, but not for
Hypotheses 1a or 1b. Specifically, physicians who reported higher rates of impostor
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thoughts one week before a patient encounter were rated by their patients as displaying
higher interpersonal performance. However, there was no significant relationship
between physician impostor thoughts and task performance. Although these results
provide some insight into the predictions posed by this research effort, they also raise a
number of questions and are subject to some limitations. First, as noted, I did not find a
significant relationship between impostor thoughts and task performance. Such a
relationship may have been hard to detect due to the distributions of task performance
values. For example, values of patient-rated task performance were closely concentrated
around a value of “6,” which was equivalent to an agree. As such, to understand this
relationship, it was important to examine my hypotheses in a second sample. Second, I
had yet to test the moderating role of gender on the relationship between impostor
thoughts and interpersonal performance as well as the role of unfamiliar role
responsibilities in prompting impostor thoughts. Third, there may be alternative
explanations for my results. To address these three points I conducted a second study in a
population of employees at an investment solutions company.
STUDY 2
Participants and Procedure
In Study 2, I engaged in a multi-period, time-lagged data collection process with
employees at an investment solutions firm headquartered in the Northeastern United
States. Employees completed a survey at Time 1 that captured the antecedent and
independent variable of interest as well as control variables and demographic
information. Approximately 18 weeks later, at Time 2, supervisors provided ratings of
employees’ task and interpersonal performance. Because I obtained data on my
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independent and dependent variables at different time periods, I was able to mitigate
concerns related to common method-common source bias (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Clark,
2002; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
After receiving an email from the organization’s head of human resources
describing the purpose of my time-lagged study as one meant to augment findings from
the organization’s annual employee survey, 193 out of 317 employees opted into Survey
1 at Time 1 (a response rate of 61%). At Time 2, supervisors providing ratings for 200
out of 317 employees (a response rate of 63%). Because not all employees received
ratings from supervisors, I employed listwise deletion to handle missing data. After doing
so, the final sample consisted of 140 employees (a final response rate of 44%). Sixtyseven percent of the final sample was male, and 87% identified as Caucasian, 6%
identified as Asian-American, and the remaining 3% identified as African-American,
Native-American, or other. Their average age was 36.3 years (SD = 9.8), and their
average organizational tenure was 6.3 years (SD = 6.1). Thirty-eight percent classified
their role as an Analyst; 21% classified their role as a Senior Analyst; 14% classified
their role as a Manager, 2% classified their role as a Senior Manager; 13% classified their
role as a Director; and finally 12% classified their role as a Vice President or higher.
Measures
Unless otherwise noted, respondents used a seven-point Likert scale ranging from
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree when responding to the items below.
Antecedent variable: Unfamiliar role responsibilities (Time 1). I measured
unfamiliar role responsibilities using three items inspired by those developed by Dragoni,
Tesluk, Russell, and Oh (2009). After the stem, “Currently at work…,” employees saw
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three items including “I am doing a type of work dramatically different from what I have
done before” and “I am navigating new terrain in order to complete my job
responsibilities” (α = .84).
Independent variable: Impostor thoughts (Time 1). I measured impostor
thoughts using the same measure as in Study 1, which relied on a six-point frequency
scale. Employees were presented with the stem, “At work, I have thought that…,”
followed by five items. A sample item was “People important to me think I am more
capable than I think I am” (α = .91).
Outcome variable: Task performance (Time 2). To measure task performance,
supervisors provided ratings for employees using four items developed by Pearce and
Porter (1986) that involved rating employees on a quantile 10-point scale that ranged
from “bottom 10%” to “top 10%.” These four items captured employees’ overall
performance, ability to get tasks done on time, the quality of their performance, and the
achievement of work goals, respectively (α = .93).
Outcome variable: Interpersonal performance (Time 2). To measure
interpersonal performance, supervisors provided ratings for employees using four items
adapted from Van Scotter, Motowidlo, and Cross (2000). A sample item was “This
employee creates effective working relationships with colleagues” (α = .85).
Moderating variable: Gender (Time 1). At Time 1, employees indicated whether
they were male or female. Gender was coded as a binary variable (0 = male, 1 = female).
Control variables (Time 1). I controlled for neuroticism and self-efficacy because
the two constructs have been found to be related to—if not indistinguishable from—the
parent construct of the impostor phenomenon (e.g., Vergauwe et al., 2015). Furthermore,
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scholars have documented relationships between neuroticism and performance as well as
self-efficacy and performance (Judge & Bono, 2001; Smillie, Yeo, Furnham, & Jackson,
2006). To measure self-efficacy, I used four items from Chen, Gully, and Eden (2001). A
sample item was “I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself” (α
=.82). To assess neuroticism, I used five items from Costa and McCrae’s (1992)
neuroticism scale. A sample item was “I often feel tense and jittery” (α =.85).
Analyses and Results
Table 5 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study
variables. As can be seen in Table 5, many of the zero-order correlations provided
directional support for my theoretical model. To formally test my hypotheses, however, I
relied on structural equation modeling, which required first specifying a measurement
model.
----Insert Table 5 Here---Measurement model: Confirmatory factor analyses. As is convention, I looked
to first see whether the data fit my proposed measurement model. In other words, I
looked to ensure that there existed discriminant validity among those constructs assessed
by scales from the same source (for employees: unfamiliar role responsibilities, impostor
thoughts, self-efficacy, and neuroticism; for supervisors: task and interpersonal
performance). To do so, I loaded each item of my measures onto the respective higherorder factors of unfamiliar role responsibilities, impostor thoughts, self-efficacy,
neuroticism, task performance, and interpersonal performance (model 1). I allowed the
error variances of two items in the neuroticism measure to correlate due to similarities in
item wording. Next, to assess model fit, I examined goodness-of-fit statistics, which
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included the comparative fit index (CFI), the nonnormed fit index (TLI), and the
standardized root mean square residual (SRMSR). CFI and TLI values greater than 0.90
and SRMSR values less than 0.10 would indicate acceptable model fit (Kline, 1998). As
can be seen in Table 6, model 1 fit the data well (χ2(259)= 380.47, CFI=.94, TFI=.94,
SRMSR=.06). Further, the loadings of the items onto their respective latent variables
were statistically significant (p <.001) with a minimum average loading equal to .75.
To further assess whether my proposed model had a superior fit to alternative
models, I examined the fit statistics of more parsimonious five-factor models: a model in
which I combined unfamiliar role responsibilities with impostor thoughts (model 2), a
model in which I combined impostor thoughts with neuroticism (model 3), a model in
which I combined impostor thoughts with self-efficacy (model 4), a model in which I
combined unfamiliar role responsibilities with neuroticism (model 5), a model in which I
combined unfamiliar role responsibilities with self-efficacy (model 6), a model in which I
combined neuroticism with self-efficacy (model 7), and a model in which I combined
task performance and interpersonal performance (model 8). As can be seen in Table 6, no
alternative model fit the data as well as my hypothesized model. Furthermore, my
hypothesized model was statistically significantly different from all of the alternative
models. In sum, these results supported discriminant validity among my measures.
----Insert Table 6 Here---Structural model: Test of hypotheses. To test the hypothesized relationships, I
first specified a structural model in line with the paths proposed in Figure 1. Because task
performance and interpersonal performance represent different facets of job performance
more broadly (Campbell, 1990; Griffin et al., 2007; Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996), I
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allowed the disturbance terms on these two latent variables to correlate. Furthermore,
because supervisors provided ratings of often multiple employees (average number of
employees per supervisor = 2.69), I was concerned about data non-independence. As
such, I clustered my standard errors by supervisor before estimating any path estimates.
To assess the fit of the proposed structural model, I examined only the standardized root
mean square residual (SRMSR) because the comparative fit index (CFI) and the
nonnormed fit index (TLI) are considered invalid and are therefore not provided by
statistical programs such as STATA when using clustered standard errors. I found that the
SRMSR was equal to .07. Based on this value, I concluded that the structural model
proposed provided a good fit to the data. As I test each hypothesis proposed below, I
present the visual representations of my results in Figure 2 as is customary with structural
equation modeling (e.g., Rich, Lepine, & Crawford, 2010; Wo, Ambrose, & Schminke,
2015).
----Insert Figure 2 Here---I first examined the direct effects outlined in Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b,
Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 4, before examining the moderating effect of gender
outlined in Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 1a stated that impostor thoughts would be positively
related to task performance while Hypothesis 1b predicted that impostor thoughts would
be negatively related to task performance. In contrast to Hypothesis 1b, but in support of
Hypothesis 1a, there was a significant path coefficient from impostor thoughts to task
performance that was positive, not negative (ß =.19, p <.05). Hypothesis 2 predicted that
impostor thoughts would be positively associated with interpersonal performance. In
support of Hypothesis 2, and as can be seen in Figure 2, impostor thoughts was positively
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related to interpersonal performance (ß =.19, p <.01). Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that
unfamiliar role responsibilities would be positively associated with impostor thoughts. As
shown by the significant path coefficient directly linking unfamiliar role responsibilities
with impostor thoughts in Figure 2, Hypothesis 4 was supported (ß =.20, p <.05).
Multiple group comparisons: Testing the moderating role of gender. Hypothesis
3 predicted that gender would moderate the positive relationship between impostor
thoughts and interpersonal performance such that the relationship would be stronger for
males than for females. To test this hypothesis, I employed multiple group comparisons
given that the moderator of gender was binary (StataCorp, 2017). Specifically, using the
STATA group option, I simultaneously estimated two models, a version of my
hypothesized model in Figure 2 for males (n = 87) and a version for females (n = 53). I
then assessed the fit of both models. While the model estimated for males demonstrated
adequate fit (SRMSR = .08), the model estimated for females demonstrated poor fit
(SRMSR = .13), in part due to the reduced sample size and the number of indicators. As
such, I followed guidance from Kline (1998) and used partially latent variables with each
latent variable indicated by a single indicator: the mean of each measure’s items. I fixed
the error variance of each indicator to one minus the reliability, multiplied by the
variance of the indicator (Kline, 1998). After doing so, I found that the model for males
as well as the model for females demonstrated adequate fit (males: SRMSR = .02;
females: SRMSR = .03). I then assessed—via a Wald test—whether group invariance of
the parameter estimate of interest—in this case the path estimate from impostor thoughts
to interpersonal performance—was appropriate. A p-value emanating from a Wald test
below accepted thresholds would indicate that the parameter estimate of interest for
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males differed significantly from the parameter estimate for females. As hypothesized,
the path estimates from impostor thoughts to interpersonal performance for males as
compared to females were significantly different (Wald χ2(1)= 4.59, p <.05).
Consequently, I next examined whether the relationship between impostor thoughts and
interpersonal performance was stronger for males as compared to females in line with
what was hypothesized. Indeed, in support of Hypothesis 3, the effect of impostor
thoughts on interpersonal performance was stronger for males (ß =.44, p <.01) than for
females (ß =.08, n.s.).
Supplementary analyses. Given that I simultaneously estimated two models—a
version of my hypothesized model in Figure 2 for males and a version for females—I had
the opportunity to examine whether estimated parameters for other relationships differed
significantly by gender. Wald tests indicated that only the parameter estimating the
relationship between self-efficacy and interpersonal performance differed significantly
for males as compared to females (Wald χ2(1)= 4.89, p <.05). Specifically, the effect of
self-efficacy on interpersonal performance was stronger for females (ß =.67, p <.01) than
for males (ß =.07, n.s.).
Discussion
The results from Study 2 complemented and extended findings from Study 1.
Like in Study 1, I found that those employees who reported a higher frequency of
impostor thoughts were also seen to display higher levels of interpersonal performance.
Furthermore, I extended this finding by demonstrating that gender played a key
moderating role in this relationship: The positive relationship between impostor thoughts
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and interpersonal performance was stronger for males than for females. I also observed
that facing unfamiliar role responsibilities engendered impostor thoughts.
The results around task performance were more mixed across the two studies.
Whereas I did not find support for a significant relationship between impostor thoughts
and task performance in Study 1, I did find support for a significant positive relationship
in Study 2. A plausible explanation for these mixed results may be based on the
differences in task performance and in the time lag between when impostor thoughts and
performance were measured across the two samples. In my theorizing, I suggested that
having impostor thoughts induces emotional discomfort as well as motivation. Because
the fruits of one’s efforts may take time to be realized (Dane, 2010; Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1980; Ericsson et al., 1993), it is likely that the positive relationship between impostor
thoughts and task performance through motivation may be hard to observe when
performance is comprised of a one-shot interaction as in Study 1. However when task
performance is aggregated over a much longer window of time as in Study 2, employees
may be able to better harness their motivation for observable results. This explanation is
consistent with research on defensive pessimism which suggests that anxiety overpowers
motivation, thereby undermining performance, in the immediate term, but mobilizes
motivation, thereby bolstering performance, in the longer term (Norem & Cantor, 1986).
In the medium-term, then, as in Study 1, anxiety and motivation may cancel each other
out, thereby leaving task performance unaffected.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although the predominant wisdom suggests that having impostor thoughts at
work is detrimental, there may be reason to believe that the phenomenon may provide
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benefits (e.g., Clance & Imes, 1978; Eden, 1990; McNatt, 2000). In this work, I sought to
elucidate these benefits by introducing the construct of workplace impostor thoughts and
examining how such thoughts impacted task and interpersonal performance. I conclude
by considering how this investigation offers surprising insights and extensions for not
only the research on the impostor phenomenon, but also for the literature on identity and
identity negotiation at work.
Implications for Research on Impostor Thoughts
First, by developing and testing my proposed theoretical framework that explores
the relationships between impostor thoughts and two different types of job performance, I
rebalance the conversation around the phenomenon that has thus far privileged the
drawbacks without considering benefits. Across two studies, a field study of physiciansin-training and a field study of employees at an investment solutions firm, I find that
having impostor thoughts is positively associated with interpersonal performance. In
other words, those who report higher rates of impostor thoughts are also those who are
perceived to be higher in interpersonal performance. Furthermore, having impostor
thoughts may not negatively impact task performance. Rather, as I found in Study 2,
there was a significant positive relationship such that those employees who reported a
higher frequency of impostor thoughts were also those who exhibited higher levels of
task performance as reported by their supervisors. In this manner, I both expand the set of
outcomes previously considered in organizational contexts to focus on behavioral, rather
than attitudinal, consequences as well as challenge prevailing wisdom that experiencing
this phenomenon is uniformly detrimental for an individual. Such efforts are important
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given that as many as 70% of employees have entertained impostor thoughts at work
(Buchanan, 2006).
Second, I identified a key antecedent to impostor thoughts that is situationally
driven. In this manner, I return to original theorizing around the phenomenon in which
environmental influences were thought to play a large role in engendering impostor
thoughts (Clance & Imes, 1978). In spite of the fact that original theorists posited that the
phenomenon had situational origins, most extant theory and research has privileged
dispositional antecedents such as trait anxiety and perfectionism over situational ones
(Thompson et al., 2000; Topping & Kimmel, 1985; Vergauwe et al., 2015). I depart from
this emphasis to show that facing unfamiliar role responsibilities, which is a situational
factor, encourages the emergence of impostor thoughts. Facing unfamiliar role
responsibilities introduces the possibility that the expertise ascribed by one’s role may
diverge from the expertise that an individual holding that role may believe he or she has
achieved. This is because it takes time to develop the expertise to proficiently execute
unfamiliar responsibilities (Dane, 2010; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Ericsson et al., 1993).
The focus on dispositional antecedents may be understandable given that much of
the research on the phenomenon has categorized individuals as either impostors or nonimpostors, with the implication that the phenomenon reflects an individual difference
(e.g., Ferrari, 2005; Sonnak & Towell, 2001; Thompson et al., 2000). In other words,
although previous work has advanced our understanding of the phenomenon, this
research has raised questions regarding the conceptual bounds of the phenomenon. As
such, third, I clarified the conceptual confusion regarding the phenomenon by reviewing
definitions from forty years of research primarily in psychology. Based off of this effort, I
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then introduced the construct of impostor thoughts circumscribed to the organizational
domain. I offered a parsimonious definition of impostor thoughts: the belief that others
hold an overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities. I then developed a self-report
measure and validated this measure using seven different lab and field samples. This is a
critical advance as used most often in research is a problematic operationalization of the
impostor phenomenon: the 20-item Clance Impostor Phenomenon scale (Clance, 1985).
Although this scale has demonstrated some adequate convergent and discriminant
validity with regards to related constructs (Chrisman et al., 1995), confirmatory factor
analyses have signaled that the scale may be unsound (French et al., 2008). By
developing and validating a new measure, however, I lay the groundwork for subsequent
rigorous research on the phenomenon.
Implications for Research on Identity and Identity Negotiation
Through this work, I also shed light upon the importance of examining selfconcept constructs that capture the complex interplay between one’s perceptions that
others have of one at work and one’s own perceptions of oneself at work. Such an
advance is increasingly important as the nature of work becomes more and more
interdependent (Barley et al., 2017). Extant work on identity at work has focused
primarily on self-perceptions such as organization-based self-esteem (Pierce et al., 1989)
or role self-efficacy (Hannah, Schaubroeck, & Peng, 2016). Such constructs have
importantly captured individuals’ assessments of their organizational worth or their
ability to perform at work. Yet, such constructs only acknowledge self-perceptions at
work. Largely missing from these constructs are those that not only acknowledge selfperceptions, but also capture perceptions of how others perceive the self. Because the
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construct of workplace impostor thoughts encapsulates the notion that one believes that
others overestimate one’s abilities, impostor thoughts is a construct that both
acknowledges one’s perceptions of the self and others’ perceptions of the self. As such, in
introducing impostor thoughts to management, I broaden theory and research on one’s
identity or self-concept at work.
Finally, through this work, I also challenge a critical assumption underlying work
on identity negotiation, which subsumes the study of interpersonal congruence and selfverification. Work in this domain argues that individuals desire others to see them as they
see themselves (Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002; Swann Jr, 1983; Swann Jr, Pelham, &
Krull, 1989). As such, any discrepancy between one’s self-perceptions and others’
perceptions of the self is deemed aversive, regardless of the direction of the discrepancy
(Swann Jr, Johnson, & Bosson, 2009). In fact, when reflecting on the conceptualization
of interpersonal congruence, which is defined as the extent to which a person’s self-views
match others’ appraisals of the self, Polzer and colleagues (2002: 307) remarked that
“theory and operationalization treat all discrepancies of the same magnitude equally.”
Yet, in contrast, this work provides unique insight into how the belief that others have
overestimated one’s abilities—impostor thoughts—impacts critical workplace outcomes
in a way that may not fit entirely within existing theoretical frameworks on identity
negotiation. Specifically, by identifying that impostor thoughts can have benefits, this
work calls into question whether all discrepancies result in negative consequences as
previously assumed. Thus, I redirect the literature on identify negotiation, and
interpersonal congruence more specifically, to consider how and when instances of
overestimation can result in benefits.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Although the studies offered here come with strengths, they are subject to
limitations. First, while the independent and dependent variables were collected at
different time periods from separate sources thereby strengthening causal inferences,
such inferences are limited. To truly establish causation, future researchers should
experimentally manipulate impostor thoughts. Manipulating this construct will, in no
doubt, be difficult as it has yet to be done by scholars even though the construct has a
history in the domain of psychology. This may be in part due to how central impostor
thoughts are to one’s identity and the associated difficulty with making identity salient in
the lab. However, there may be promise in relying on a false-feedback paradigm in which
individuals are randomly presented with feedback that falsely creates an internal
discrepancy in which others see them as more competent than they see themselves.
Second, I did not directly test the mechanisms proposed between impostor thoughts and
task and interpersonal performance. For example, I suggested that both motivation and
emotional discomfort may emanate from impostor thoughts and have implications for
task performance. These mechanisms may compete resulting in a null effect on task
performance, or one may trump the other resulting in a negative (if emotional discomfort
trumps) or positive (if motivation trumps) effect on task performance. Furthermore, I did
not directly assess whether compensation explained the relationship between impostor
thoughts and interpersonal performance such that those with higher rates of impostor
thoughts compensated for their perceived lower competence by engaging in displays of
higher warmth. Empirically identifying the exact nature of these psychological
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mechanisms is critical for advancing understanding around the relationships between
impostor thoughts and performance.
Practical Implications
Given that impostor thoughts may be experienced by as many as 70% of
employees, it is important to revisit the prevailing assumption underlying work on the
impostor phenomenon that such thoughts may be uniformly detrimental. For example, it
may behoove employers to assign employees, who frequently interact with others,
unfamiliar role responsibilities. Doing so may engender impostor thoughts, which may
benefit others with whom these employees interact, given that I found a positive
relationship between having impostor thoughts and interpersonal performance. Such a
strategy may be particularly effective in light of the fact that I did not find a negative
relationship between impostor thoughts and task performance. Indeed, over the longerterm, entertaining higher rates of impostor thoughts was associated with higher levels of
task performance. Importantly, however, I offer a caveat to this final point: The effect of
impostor thoughts on task performance in the moment remains an open empirical
question. Thus, it is important for employers to proceed with caution when taking actions
that may place employees in stretch experiences that engender impostor thoughts if high
levels of task performance are required almost immediately.
CONCLUSION
Recent years have seen a surge in interest in a phenomenon popularly known as
the impostor syndrome. Although the predominant wisdom suggests that experiencing
this phenomenon is detrimental, there may be reason to believe that it may also be
beneficial. However, these benefits may have thus far been unobserved because current
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conceptualizations have made this phenomenon nearly indistinguishable from
neuroticism, low self-efficacy, and maladaptive perfectionism. In this work, I address
conceptual confusion and rebalance the conversation around the phenomenon by
introducing the construct of workplace impostor thoughts and by examining its
relationships with task and interpersonal performance. Taken together, my results suggest
that entertaining impostor thoughts at work may not necessarily lead to poorer task
performance. Instead, such thoughts may sometimes encourage employees to prove
themselves interpersonally.
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TABLE 1
Placing Impostor Thoughts in a Nomological Network
Construct
Definition
Self-Concept Constructs Incorporating only Self-Views

Key Differences from Impostor Thoughts

OrganizationBased SelfEsteem
(OBSE)

“The degree to which organizational
members believe they can satisfy
their needs by participating in roles”
within an organization (Pierce,
Gardner, Cummings, & Dunham,
1989: 625)

OBSE refers to self-perceived competence within an organization whereas impostor
thoughts refer to the discrepancy between how one believes others perceive one’s abilities at
work and how one perceives one’s own abilities. While one might think that those high in
impostor thoughts are likely low in OBSE, one high in impostor thoughts can hold one’s
competence in high regard, but still believe that others hold one’s competence in even
higher regard. Therefore, those high in impostor thoughts need not be low in OBSE.

Role SelfEfficacy

“People’s judgments of their
capabilities to organize and execute
courses of action required to attain
designated types of performances”
in which performance pertains to
role performance (Bandura, 1986:
94)

Because role self-efficacy captures how one perceives one’s abilities to execute one’s role,
role self-efficacy only captures half of the conceptual space that the construct of impostor
thoughts encapsulates. Furthermore, impostor thoughts make no supposition regarding the
level of role self-efficacy one possesses, merely that one’s role self-efficacy is lower than
others’ judgments of one’s capabilities to execute role responsibilities.

Core SelfEvaluations

A broad personality trait comprised
of self-esteem, generalized selfefficacy, neuroticism, and locus of
control (Judge, Erez, Bono, &
Thoreson, 2003)

Similar to the argument made differentiating OBSE from impostor thoughts, one can exhibit
high global self-esteem—that is view oneself highly—while still believing that others are
overvaluing oneself, which translates to being high in impostor thoughts.

Self-esteem: “the overall value that
one places on oneself as a person”
(Judge et al., 2003: 303)
Generalized self-efficacy: “an
evaluation of how well one can
perform across a variety of
situations” (Judge et al., 2003: 303)

Those high in impostor thoughts need not adopt a negative cognitive style, consistent with
those high in neuroticism. However, as neuroticism is tightly linked to negative affect with
measures of the latter often used to measure neuroticism (Judge, Locke, Durham, & Kluger,
1998) and as the construct of impostor thoughts is also likely associated with some negative
affect because it is uncomfortable, those high in neuroticism may also be high in impostor
thoughts. Yet, negative affect in relation to impostor thoughts is more of a byproduct of the
construct rather than synonymous with the construct.
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Neuroticism: “the tendency to have
a negative cognitive / explanatory
style and to focus on the negative

Generalized self-efficacy can be distinguished from impostor thoughts because the former
reflects one’s belief in how well one can apply self-perceived competence across situations;
in contrast, the latter construct reflects how one believes others view one’s competence with
little regard to how that view translates into actions that determine how well one performs.

aspects of the self” (Judge et al.,
2003: 303)
Locus of control: “beliefs about the
causes of events in one’s life—locus
is internal when individuals see
events as being contingent on their
own behavior” (Judge et al., 2003:
304)

While having an external locus of control and being high in impostor thoughts are likely
related given that believing that others overestimate one’s abilities suggests that one may
not believe that one has control over others’ perceptions, the two constructs differ in one key
way. Those high in impostor thoughts can recognize that others’ perceptions are contingent
on their own behavior; that behavior, however, may not be reflective of their own selfperceived competence or abilities. Rather, they may believe that it is contingent on their
charm or hard work. In this sense, then, an argument can be made that those high in
impostor thoughts may not have an external locus of control.

Self-Concept Constructs that are Interpersonally-Determined
Role-Based
Image
Discrepancies

“Misalignments between what
professionals perceive as the content
of their professional work and what
they believe others think constitutes
the professionals' professional
work” (Vough et al., 2013:1050)

Although roles lie at the heart of impostor thoughts and role-based image discrepancies, the
latter focuses on comparing perceptions regarding the scope and difficulty of one’s work,
not one’s ability to perform the work, which is central to impostor thoughts. Additionally,
the discrepancy inherent to role-based image discrepancies is opposite in valence to the one
proposed by impostor thoughts. Specifically, those who perceive role-based image
discrepancies are those who believe others hold their role in lesser regard than they
themselves hold their own role. Impostor thoughts, in contrast, capture the notion that others
have overestimated, rather than underestimated, the self.

Interpersonal
Congruence

“The degree of similarity between a
person’s self-views and others’
appraisal of that person” (Polzer et
al., 2002: 299)

In some ways, impostor thoughts can be thought to be one type of interpersonal congruence.
Implied in the construct of interpersonal congruence is the possibility that there may be an
actual discrepancy in how one views oneself as well as how others appraise one on the same
dimension. Specifically, interpersonal congruence varies along a continuum ranging from
high agreement (high interpersonal congruence) to low agreement (low interpersonal
congruence) between one’s self-views and others’ appraisals. In this manner, interpersonal
congruence is largely agnostic to the direction of disagreement should there be any. This is
in contrast to the construct of impostor thoughts, which (1) relies on only a perceived, not
actual, discrepancy between how one views one’s abilities in a role and how others view
one’s abilities, and (2) rests on the idea that others have overestimated one’s abilities to
perform in one’s role.

63

TABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 1

Variables
1

Impostor Thoughts

Mean S.D.

1

3.20

1.07

---

2

3

4

5

2

Task Performance (PatientRated)

6.06

0.87

0.12

---

3

Task Performance
(Diagnosis) a

0.53

0.50

-0.23

0.10

---

4

Task Performance
(Treatment Plan) a

0.91

0.29

0.00

0.02

0.02

---

3.41

0.47

0.32*

0.79***

0.11

0.11

---

37.36 2.60

.002

-0.27†

0.05

0.23

-0.18

5
6

Interpersonal Performance
MCATb

6

---

Note. n = 45; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed); aThese variables are binary. b41 out of 45
physicians-in-training provided their MCAT scores; correlations with all other measures are thus only for those 41
physicians-in-training.

64

TABLE 3a
Relationship Between Impostor Thoughts and Task Performance (Without Control)
Diagnosis Accuracy

Treatment Plan Accuracy

Patient-Rated

Variables

estimate

SE

Wald

estimate

SE

Wald

estimate

SE

t

Intercept

-0.46

0.30

2.31

0.00

0.49

0.00

5.65

0.40

14.03***

Impostor Thoughts

1.60

1.02

2.46

2.31

1.66

1.94

0.09

0.11

0.85

-2 log likelihood

59.73

27.00

112.21

Note. n = 45; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)
TABLE 3b
Relationship Between Impostor Thoughts and Task Performance (With Control)
Diagnosis Accuracy

Treatment Plan Accuracy

Patient-Rated

Variables

estimate

SE

Wald

estimate

SE

Wald

estimate

SE

t

Intercept

-0.07

4.83

0.00

-7.08

7.98

0.79

11.33

1.63

6.97***

MCAT

0.04

0.13

0.08

0.29

0.21

1.88

-0.15

0.04

-3.63**

Impostor Thoughts

-0.36

0.30

1.40

-0.30

0.62

0.23

0.10

0.10

1.03

-2 log likelihood

55.08

19.32

91.00

Note. n = 41; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)
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TABLE 4a
Relationship Between Impostor Thoughts and Interpersonal Performance (Without
Control)
Patient-Rated Interpersonal Performance
Variables

estimate

SE

t

Intercept

2.98

0.20

14.79***

Impostor Thoughts

0.12

0.05

2.16*

-2 log likelihood

52.83

Note. n = 45; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)
TABLE 4b
Relationship Between Impostor Thoughts and Interpersonal Performance (With
Control)
Patient-Rated Interpersonal Performance
Variables

estimate

SE

t

Intercept

5.50

0.84

6.54***

MCAT

-0.07

0.02

-3.07**

Impostor Thoughts

0.11

0.05

2.23*

-2 log likelihood

36.93

Note. n = 41; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)

TABLE 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 2
Variables

1

Mean S.D.

Unfamiliar Role 3.65
Responsibilities

2

Impostor
Thoughts

3

Neuroticism

4

Self-Efficacy

5

1.33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

---

2.11

0.93

0.21*

---

2.84

1.19

0.19*

0.30***

---

6.05

0.63

0.03

-0.22**

-0.12

---

Task
Performance

8.02

1.70

0.06

0.15†

-0.07

0.03

---

6

Interpersonal
Performance

5.95

0.88

-0.09

0.12

-0.18*

0.11

0.54***

---

7

Gender

0.38

0.49

0.14

0.05

0.15†

0.03

0.13

-0.03

---

Note. n = 140; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)
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TABLE 6
Measurement Model and Alternative Models
Model

Detail

χ2

Df

CFI

TLI

SRMR

Δχ2(df)

1

Six factors

380.47

259

.94

.94

.06

---

2

Five factors; unfamiliar
responsibilities and impostor thoughts
combined

548.09

264

.87

.86

.09

167.62 (5)

3

Five factors; impostor thoughts and
neuroticism combined

623.00

264

.83

.81

.11

242.53 (5)

4

Five factors; impostor thoughts and
self-efficacy combined

571.08

264

.86

.84

.10

190.61 (5)

5

Five factors; unfamiliar
responsibilities and neuroticism
combined

643.77

264

.83

.80

.12

263.30 (5)

6

Five factors; unfamiliar
responsibilities and self-efficacy
combined

591.57

264

.85

.83

.11

211.10 (5)

7

Five factors; neuroticism and selfefficacy combined

585.09

264

.85

.83

.10

204.62 (5)

8

Five factors; task and interpersonal
performance combined

591.63

264

.85

.83

.08

211.16 (5)
68

Note. n = 140; model with best fit in bold. All χ2 and Δχ22 values are p < .001. Δχ2 tests relative to model 1.
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FIGURE 1
Theoretical Framework

FIGURE 2
Study 2 Structural Model

Note. Estimates are standardized paths; n = 140; * p < .05 (2-tailed). Standard errors are
clustered by supervisor. Moderating pathway of gender not presented in figure. This
moderating hypothesis was tested using multiple-group structural equation modelling.
Controls include self-efficacy and neuroticism.
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APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCT VALIDATION
The construct validation process may be best thought of as an abductive process
in which one iterates between theory and data to develop plausible items that can measure
a phenomenon of interest (Walton, 2004). In other words, construct validation involves
the development of a measure based on existing theory or inductive work that is
subsequently refined as a result of emerging empirical data. Although distinct from
inductive or deductive approaches in that the outcomes of abduction are neither probable
(as they are for induction) nor predictive (as they are for deduction), abduction often
complements induction and deduction in management research (Okhuysen & Behfar,
2015). I similarly adopt principles of abduction, induction, and deduction as I develop a
measure of impostor thoughts, consistent with guidance on scale development (DeVellis,
1991; Hinkin, 1995, 1998). The process of developing a measure can be divided into
multiple steps (Hinkin, 1998): item generation, questionnaire administration, item
reduction, confirmatory factor analysis, as well as convergent and discriminant validity
testing. I expound on each of these steps below.
METHOD
Participants
I used a panel of PhD students to develop items intended to measure impostor
thoughts. I then followed up with six different samples to validate my items. Sample A
consisted of executives affiliated with a leadership development, executive coaching, and
consulting firm. Sample B consisted of undergraduate students from a large private
university in the northeastern part of the United States. Sample C consisted of secondyear medical students from a large private university in the northeastern part of the
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United States. Sample D consisted of 210 members of the community recruited by the
behavioral lab associated with a large private university in the northeastern part of the
United States. Sample E consisted of 392 Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets at two
public universities in the South. Finally, Sample F consisted of undergraduate students
from a large private university in the northeastern part of the United States. See Table A1
for details on each of these samples.
----Insert Table A1 Here---Round 1: Item Generation, Questionnaire Administration, and Item Reduction
To develop a pool of items that could sample the theoretical domain of impostor
thoughts, I iterated between extant theory and current prevailing wisdom on the
phenomenon. As noted, the phenomenon of impostor thoughts has a long history in the
domain of psychology, which could suggest that the extant theoretical foundation
provides sufficient information to develop plausible items. However, as also noted, the
phenomenon has suffered from a proliferation of definitions and subsequently weak
measures, hampering research on the phenomenon (French et al., 2008; Fujie, 2010;
Sakulku & Alexander, 2011). As such, I triangulated between both inductive and
deductive approaches. Deductively, I identified the most commonly used definitions for
impostor thoughts, or the phenomenon more broadly. A consistent implicit or explicit
definitional theme across most influential conceptualizations of impostor thoughts was a
tendency to believe that others have overestimated one’s abilities or talent (Clance &
O’Toole, 1987; Harvey & Katz, 1985; September et al., 2001). See Table A2 for a list of
the most influential conceptualizations. As such, in this work, I began with the starting
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premise that impostor thoughts reflected the proclivity to believe that others have an
overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities.
----Insert Table A2 Here---To confirm that the deductively-derived definition was the appropriate definition,
I next adopted an inductive, qualitative approach relying on news articles and blog posts
posted on the Internet. I chose to use these archival materials because of the intellectual
journey I embarked upon in attempting to study this phenomenon. Preliminary semistructured interviews indicated that individuals looked to the Internet to make sense of
the phenomenon of interest given that it was an uncomfortable experience. For example,
one interviewee stated,
It’s risky to talk about the impostor stuff with work colleagues. If you show
weakness in the workplace, it can be held against you either explicitly or
implicitly. (29-year old male online retail strategy professional)
Therefore, I followed my interviewees’ advice and looked to the same source they used:
the Internet. Inductively examining this type of archival data was useful because it
permitted me to elicit “thick, detailed descriptions” that “preserve the actual meanings”
that underlie the phenomenon of interest (Gephart, 2004: 455) by the very actors at the
forefront of the discourse, i.e., those writers and bloggers seeking to offer guidance to the
very individuals looking to learn more about the phenomenon.
Data collection and analysis. To create a rigorous sample of articles and blog
posts that mitigated potential biases associated with relying on archival sources1, I

1
Using news articles and blog posts as the primary sources also presents challenges. Specifically, it
introduces two potential biases: selection bias and coverage bias. Selection bias refers to the notion that the
population of articles available for analysis is not necessarily a representative sample of all the articles that
could have been published on the phenomenon of interest (D’Alessio and Allen, 2000). In other words,
those who select what can be published have a great deal of discretion, potentially limiting the multitude of
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performed an extensive data collection process using a variety of search parameters. This
process was comprised of three steps: identifying news sources, searching within these
sources for specific articles mentioning the phenomenon, and reading through each text
to ensure rigor and relevance. My final sample set consisted of 377 articles and blog posts
that altogether contained 148,311 words. See Figure A1 for detail on each step of this
process.
----Insert Figure A1---I then sought to distill the 148,311 words into discrete text excerpts following
guidance from Carton (2018) and Suddaby and Greenwood (2005). As I was interested in
primarily defining and elaborating the construct of impostor thoughts, I sought to
categorize texts according to whether they defined the phenomenon of interest or
illuminated a relationship that the phenomenon might have with another construct. To
accurately assess whether a text excerpt was more definitional or more relational in
nature, I first developed “first-order” codes followed by “second-order” codes (Van
Maanen, 1979). “First-order” codes are those categories that directly emerge from the
content of the excerpts while “second-order” codes are those categories that the
researcher imposes upon the content (Van Maanen, 1979). As a result of the coding
process, I identified that 606 of the 2164 text excerpts illuminated definitional elements
of the impostor thoughts construct.
Preliminary findings. At the root of the phenomenon was the belief that others
overestimated the self. In particular, those who had impostor thoughts believed that

opinions available on the phenomenon of interest. Coverage bias refers to the idea that writers and bloggers
curate their content to favor that which is deemed most newsworthy or interesting, thus producing what is
known as one-sided coverage (D’Alessio and Allen, 2000).
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others held an overly positive view regarding their own talents or abilities. For example,
when describing the phenomenon, authors remarked:
Those of us who suffer with this confidence-zapping mindset believe that those
around us have over-estimated our abilities…(Article 216, Passage 4)
Too many of us believe that “I’m not as smart or as good as others might think I
am.” (Article 11, Passage 3)
The person usually harbours thoughts such as, “People think that I am smarter
than I really am.” (Article 32, Passage 8)
In other words, those high in impostor thoughts believed that they did not have the level
of abilities, qualities, or attributes that others ascribed to them. As such, it became clear
that defining impostor thoughts as the belief that others hold an overly positive view of
one’s talent or abilities seemed apt.
Item development. With a definition in mind, a key concern that I had was
developing items that would prompt a range of responses from respondents in order to
yield sufficient variance (Stone, 1978). Response variance is particularly influenced by
the scale used: agreement or frequency (Stone, 1978). Given the prevalence of agreement
scales in organizational behavior, I first created fourteen items that required respondents
to respond using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree
(e.g., “I often think I am unworthy of the status I have been given” or “I believe I have
received greater recognition than I merit”). I then subjected these items to an assessment
of content validity using 12 late-stage management-related doctoral students from five
departments across four business schools in the United States and Europe. In detail, these
content experts looked through items that were part of the 10-item Rosenberg (1965) selfesteem scale, the 8-item Oleson and colleagues (2000) self-doubt scale, and the fourteen
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items generated by me. They then assigned each item to their intended construct in line
with guidance on assessing content validity from Anderson and Gerbing (1991). There
were two instances in which items intended to measure impostor thoughts were
incorrectly assigned to self-esteem. There were four instances in which items intended to
measure impostor thoughts were incorrectly assigned to self-doubt. From this assessment,
I reduced the pool of items to eight items. I then looked to eliminate redundancies, ending
with a pool of five items.
Next, I administered my five scale items to two populations (Samples A and B,
respectively): a sample of 27 high-level executives of firms in a variety of industries
including education, finance, mining, and transportation and a larger sample of 152
undergraduates at private university in the northeastern part of the United States. The
average score for executives was quite low, equivalent to answering disagree on the 7point Likert scale, and there was little variation among the respondents (M = 2.15, SD =
0.84). To confirm that these results were not sample-specific, I then turned to the sample
of undergraduate students. Although the mean was slightly higher and the standard
deviation was slightly larger (M = 3.50, SD = 1.21), debriefs with undergraduate students
after questionnaire administration indicated a hesitancy to indicate agreement with the
items as the modal response was “2,” which is equivalent to answering disagree on the 7point Likert scale. As such, I returned back to my theoretical foundation to develop new
items.
Round 2: Item Generation, Questionnaire Administration, and Item Reduction
My second iteration of scale development involved modifying the items in the
previous round that exhibited high content validity so that they were based on a
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frequency scale ranging from 1 = never to 6 = very frequently (daily or almost daily). I
concluded that a frequency scale might better suit the measurement of impostor thoughts
because it could reduce social desirability and therefore potentially increase variance. To
the extent that respondents wanted to present themselves in a favorable light (Ganster,
Hennessey, & Luthans, 1983), a frequency scale could allow them to report impostor
thoughts without suggesting that they were deficient, flawed, or incompetent. I became
more confident in my intuition when I returned to the data underlying my inductive
approach. Specifically, experiencing impostor thoughts involved ebbs and flows. In other
words, there were period of times in which writers commented that individuals
experienced intense bouts of the phenomenon, while at other times impostor thoughts
were latent.
For most, [having impostor thoughts] is fleeting but for some people it persists
over time. They just never feel like they should be where they are, or that they
should have achieved all that they have achieved. (Article 130, Passage 1)
I feel like I could change the world. But sometimes the response I get makes me
think: “Oh – they’ve figured it out. They’ve figured out that I’m nothing special.”
I sometimes feel like I’m going to get found out – like I’m just a normal girl. I
have people thinking I’m fucking amazing and then other people thinking I’m
shit, and it’s really hard to believe you’re good when that keeps happening. But
there are occasional moments when I feel like what I’ve achieved is pretty
phenomenal, considering my background. (Article 64, Passage 2)
Based on my intuition that a frequency scale might allow for greater variance in
respondents’ answers, I generated five items to measure the phenomenon. I then
conducted exploratory factor analyses using data from 103 second-year medical students
at a large private Northeastern U.S. university who were one month shy of beginning
their clinical clerkships during which they would rotate among various medical fields
including Psychiatry, Pediatrics, and Surgery (i.e., Sample C). Specifically, I conducted
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an exploratory factor analysis using principal components with direct oblimin rotation.
Results from this analysis showed that all items loaded onto a single factor (each with
loadings greater than 0.70). See Table A3 for the scale items, descriptive statics, loadings,
and reliability. The reliability for the resulting impostor thoughts scale was a Cronbach’s
alpha equal to 0.89 with a mean of 3.40 and a standard deviation of 1.05.
----Insert Table A3 Here---Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Having determined that the generated scale items were internally consistent and
have adequate content validity, I next sought to assess the external consistency. In other
words, I looked to execute a confirmatory factor analysis with data collected from an
independent sample per recommendations by Hinkin (1998). The purpose of conducting a
confirmatory factor analysis with this sample was to determine the model fit, i.e., that
indeed a one-factor structure was appropriate for the five-item scale measuring impostor
thoughts. To conduct a confirmatory factor analysis, I used data from 210 community
members who were recruited to fill out the questionnaire in a lab at large private
Northeastern U.S. university (i.e., Sample D). I tested a one-factor solution and a twofactor solution in order to confirm that a one-factor solution was optimal. Although the
RMSEA was higher than the suggested 0.10 or less for both models, I concluded that the
one-factor solution fit the data better than a two-factor solution because the one-factor
solution had a comparative fit index (CFI) as well as a nonnormed fit index (TLI) that
exceeded 0.9 as recommended by Kline (1998). Specifically, the one-factor solution had
a chi-square value 27.15 (p < 0.001 df = 5), a CFI of 0.96, a TLI of 0.91, and an SRMR
of 0.04 while the two-factor solution had a chi-square value of 26.31 (p < 0.00001 df =
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4), a CFI of 0.96, a TLI of 0.89, and an SRMR of 0.04. Although ever so slight, the onefactor solution had a superior fit.
The impostor thoughts scale displayed consistent high reliability with a
Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.86 in both Samples D and E. In Sample D, the scale mean
was 3.41 and the standard deviation was 1.09. In Sample E, the mean was 3.09 and the
standard deviation was 1.26.
Convergent Validity
The primary way of assessing convergent validity involves comparing the
developed measure with established measures of the same construct. Positive correlations
between the developed scale and the established scales would indicate that the new scale
measured the similar conceptual space as the established scales (Campbell & Fiske,
1959). Using a population of 175 undergraduates at large private Northeastern U.S.
university (i.e., Sample F), I found a significant positive correlation between my fiveitem scale and the 20-item Clance Impostor Phenomenon scale (Clance, 1985), the most
used measure for studying the impostor phenomenon in extant research (r = 0.58, p <
.001). Therefore, I concluded that my impostor thoughts scale assessed a construct
similar to the one captured by the Clance Impostor Phenomenon scale.
Discriminant Validity
I finally sought to determine whether the five items I generated to measure
impostor thoughts were related but distinct from other items measuring related constructs.
For example, because having impostor thoughts is an uncomfortable experience in which
one believes others hold them to higher esteem than they hold themselves, I expected that
those who have impostor thoughts to have lower core self-evaluations, defined as a broad
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trait that captures self-esteem, self-efficacy, neuroticism, and self-efficacy (Judge, Erez,
Bono, & Thoresen, 2003). Using Sample D, I administered a questionnaire containing the
5-item impostor thoughts scale as well as Judge et al.’s (2003) core self-evaluations scale.
Using Sample C, I administered a questionnaire containing the 5-item impostor thoughts
scale, the 10-item Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale, and the 8-item Chen et al. (2001)
self-efficacy scale. Finally, using Sample E, I administered the 5-item impostor thoughts
scale alongside the Watson, Tellegen, and Clark (1988) 5-item negative affect scale and
the Costa and McCrae (1992) 12-item neuroticism scale.
To assess discriminant validity, I examined the zero-order correlations among the
scales. A significant correlation would leave open the question of whether the two
constructs were distinct. If a significant correlation was present, I assessed whether
significantly-correlated constructs loaded onto a single factor or two factors when the two
constructs were allowed to covary. Tables A4, A5, and A6 report the zero-order
correlations between impostor thoughts and the constructs of core self-evaluations, selfefficacy, self-esteem, negative affect, and neuroticism. As expected, the construct of
impostor thoughts was negatively related to core self-evaluations (r = -0.43, p < 0.001).
Additionally, as expected, the construct of impostor thoughts was negatively related to
both self-esteem (r = -0.51, p < 0.001) and self-efficacy (r = -0.34, p < 0.001). Finally, as
expected, the construct of impostor thoughts was positively related to both negative affect
(r = 0.30, p < 0.001) and neuroticism (r = 0.36, p < 0.001).
----Insert Tables A4, A5 and A6 Here---I next conducted confirmatory factor analyses to check if the construct of
impostor thoughts was distinct from these five constructs with which it correlated
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significantly. This was determined by assessing whether there was a significant
difference when comparing models via a chi-squared test. A significant difference would
signal that one should opt for the model that exhibits better goodness-of-fit statistics.
Indeed, for all five constructs, a two-factor solution fit the data better than a one-factor
solution when considering each construct vis-à-vis the construct of impostor thoughts.
There was a significant difference between a one-factor solution in which all indicators
for impostor thoughts and core self-evaluations loaded onto the same factor and a twofactor solution (Δχ2(1, N = 210) = 320.9, p < 0.001). Further, the two-factor solution fit
the data better than the one-factor solution. Specifically, the one-factor solution had a CFI
of 0.60 and a RMSEA of 0.18 while the two-factor solution had a CFI of 0.90 and a
RMSEA of 0.09. Note that I also allowed the errors of the reverse-coded items in the core
self-evaluations scale to covary.
There was also a significant difference between a one-factor solution in which all
indicators for impostor thoughts and self-esteem loaded onto the same factor and a twofactor solution (Δχ2(1, N = 103) = 202.0, p < 0.001), and a significant difference between
a one-factor solution in which all indicators for impostor thoughts and self-efficacy
loaded onto the same factor and a two-factor solution (Δχ2(1, N = 103) = 264.8, p <
0.001). In detail, the one-factor solution involving impostor thoughts and self-esteem had
a CFI of 0.73 and a RMSEA of 0.19 while the two-factor solution had a CFI of 0.94 and a
RMSEA of 0.09. Note that I also allowed the errors of the reverse-coded items in the selfesteem scale to covary. Further, the one-factor solution involving impostor thoughts and
self-efficacy had a CFI of 0.75 and a RMSEA of 0.21 while the two-factor solution had a
CFI of 0.95 and a RMSEA of 0.09.
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Finally, there was a significant difference between a one-factor solution in which
all indicators for impostor thoughts and negative affect loaded onto one factor and a twofactor solution in which they loaded onto two different factors (Δχ2(1, N = 392) = 843.1,
p < 0.001). Further, the two-factor solution fit the data better than the one-factor solution
(two-factor solution: CFI= .94, RMSEA = .10; one-factor solution: CFI= .54, RMSEA =
.27). There was also a significant difference between a one-factor solution in which all
indicators for impostor thoughts and neuroticism loaded onto one factor and a two-factor
solution in which they loaded onto two different factors (Δχ2(1, N = 392) = 881.33, p <
0.001). Further, the two-factor solution fit the data better than the one-factor solution
(two-factor solution: CFI= .90, RMSEA = .09; one-factor solution: CFI= .65, RMSEA =
.17). Together, these results provided initial evidence of the construct validity of the
developed impostor thoughts measure.

TABLE A1
Characteristics of Samples Used in Construct Validation
Sample

Source

N

Gender

A

Executives
affiliated with a
leadership
development firm
Undergraduate
students at a large
private
Northeastern U.S.
university
Second-year
medical students
at a large private
Northeastern U.S.
university

27

81.0% F
(19.0% M)

152

69.5% F
(29.5% M)

20.1 years

103

52.4% F
(47.6% M)

25.0 years

210

67.1% F
(32.9% M)

23.4 years

B

C

D

Community
sample at a large
private
Northeastern U.S.
university

Average
Age
45.7 years

Ethnicity
81% White
/ Caucasian

Organizational
Tenure
13.0 years

36.2%
White /
Caucasian;
40.1%
Asian
44.7%
White /
Caucasian;
25.2%
Asian

N/A

37.6%
White /
Caucasian;
30.5%
Asian

0.7 years (if
include all
undergraduate
students); 4.8
years (if
undergraduate
students are not
included)

N/A

Analysis
Initial item
generation and
questionnaire
administration
Initial item
generation and
questionnaire
administration
Revised item
generation and
questionnaire
administration,
exploratory factor
analysis, convergent
/ discriminant
validity
Confirmatory factor
analysis,
discriminant validity
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E

ROTC cadets in
the Southern U.S.

392

69.4% M
(30.6% F)

21.0 years

48.5%
1.9 years
Discriminant
White /
validity, test-retest
Caucasian;
reliability
37.0%
Hispanic
F
Undergraduate
175
72.6% F
20.1 years
40.6%
N/A
Convergent validity
students at a large
(27.4% M)
White /
private
Caucasian;
Northeastern U.S.
34.9%
university
Asian
Note. In Sample D, only 30 respondents were not undergraduate students, hence the low organizational tenure. Panel of PhD students
not included in the above.
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TABLE A2
Influential Conceptualizations of Impostor Thoughts, or the Impostor Phenomenon, more broadly, in the Literature
Influential Conceptualizations

Source

“Women who experience the impostor phenomenon maintain a strong belief that they are not
intelligent…Women professionals in our sample feel over evaluated by colleagues and administrators.
One women professor said, ‘I’m not good enough to be on the faculty here. Some mistake was made
in the selection process.’ Another, the chairperson of her department, said, ‘Obviously I’m in this
position because my abilities have been overestimated.’”

(Clance & Imes,
1978:1)

“The sense of having fooled others into overestimating [their] ability”

(Harvey & Katz,
1985: 8)

“The subjective experience of perceived intellectual phoniness that is held by certain high-achieving
adults…For instance students who feel fraudulent often fantasize that they were mistakenly admitted
to graduate school because of an error by the admissions committee or that their high examination
scores are due to…the faulty judgments of professors.”

(Kolligan Jr. &
Sternberg, 1991:
309)

“The primary defining characteristic is the sense of being an impostor or a fraud—believing that
others perceive oneself more favorably than is warranted.”

(Leary et al.,
2000: 726)

A consistent theme across influential conceptualizations of the impostor phenomenon is the “tendency to believe that
others have overestimated one’s abilities or talent.”
Note. Italics have been added for emphasis.
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TABLE A3
Impostor Thoughts Scale Descriptive Statistics, Loadings, and Reliability

Item Mean

Item SD

Factor
Loading

People important to me think I am
more capable than I think I am.

3.58

1.30

0.79

Alpha if
Item
Deleted
0.88

Others think I have more knowledge
or ability than I think I do.

3.65

1.17

0.85

0.87

Other people see me more positively
than my capabilities warrant.

3.27

1.26

0.92

0.84

I have received greater recognition
from others than I merit.

3.08

1.29

0.78

0.88

I am not as qualified as others think
I am.

3.44

1.28

0.85

0.87

Scale Item

Note. Responses range from 1= “never” to 6= “very frequently (daily or almost daily).”
Calculated from Sample C. α = 089.

TABLE A4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variables

Mean S.D.

1

2

1

Impostor
Thoughts

3.41

1.09

2

Core SelfEvaluations

4.64

0.99 -0.43***

(0.87)

3

Defensive
Pessimism

4.86

0.96

-0.11

3

(0.86)

0.21**

(0.90)

Note. n = 210; based off of Sample D; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed);
Cronbach’s alphas are reported on the diagonal.
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TABLE A5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variables

Mean S.D.

1

2

1

Impostor
Thoughts

3.41

1.05

2

Self-Esteem

5.11

0.99 -0.51***

3

Self-Efficacy

5.38

0.88 -0.34*** 0.70***

3

(0.89)
(0.90)
(0.95)

Note. n = 103; based off of Sample C; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed);
Cronbach’s alphas are reported on the diagonal.

TABLE A6
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variables

1

Impostor
Thoughts

Mean S.D.

1

2

3.09

1.26

(0.86)

2 Negative Affect

2.97

1.49

0.30***

3

2.83

1.20

0.36*** 0.66***

Neuroticism

3

(0.87)
(0.91)

Note. n = 392; based off of Sample E; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed);
Cronbach’s alphas are reported on the diagonal.

FIGURE A1
Data Collection Process for Inductively-Deriving Items
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CHAPTER 2

FOUND OUT OR PSYCHED UP:
HOW AND WHEN WORKPLACE IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS BREED MASTERY
AT WORK

ABSTRACT
Mastering one’s work responsibilities is integral for professional success. Yet, the
changing nature of work may threaten its development among employees. This is because
the rate by which employees are advancing in their careers is accelerating while skill
acquisition remains a gradual process. As a result, employees may increasingly find
themselves in roles in which they may think that they do not have the abilities to meet the
high levels of proficiency expected. In other words, they may increasingly entertain
workplace impostor thoughts. Indeed, having such thoughts may be far from rare.
Accordingly, in this paper, I seek to understand the relationship between workplace
impostor thoughts and job mastery. Building on the core ideas and concepts underlying
theories of cognitive dissonance, I articulate a model that outlines how and when
workplace impostor thoughts encourage mastery at work. I test my model in a two-timeperiod field study of 196 Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets and a three-time-period
study of 161 employees of an investment solutions company. I find that impostor
thoughts is related to job mastery through the competing mechanisms of introjected
motivation and a fear of being found out. Whether one responds with fear or motivation
depends on one’s helping behaviors at work and one’s growth mindset. Taken together,
my results suggest that having workplace impostor thoughts may be both a boon and a
bane for mastery at work.

89
Mastering the skills and responsibilities of one’s work role is critical to
professional success. In comparison to those who do not master their role responsibilities,
those who do rapidly settle into new organizations (Reichers, 1987), display higher job
performance (Chao, O'Leary-Kelly, Wolf, Klein, & Gardner, 1994), and receive greater
rewards such as bonuses or promotions (Aryee & Chu, 2012). Furthermore, those who
exhibit high job mastery feel more efficacious (Wood & Bandura, 1989), display higher
affective commitment towards their organizations (Simosi, 2010), report being happier at
work (Cherrington, Reitz, & Scott, 1971; Staw & Barsade, 1993), and experience
increased job security (Helmreich, Spence, Beane, Lucker, & Matthews, 1980). Indeed,
so revered is the concept of mastery, that it inspires one of the most popular idioms of the
English language—“A jack of all trades, master of none”—a phrase meant to praise those
who have developed deep expertise, and belittle those who have acquired only a
superficial skillset (Morris & Morris, 1988). As such, it comes as no surprise that job
mastery is of critical importance to employers and employees alike.
Although job mastery is integral to professional success, the changing nature of
work threatens its development among employees. Changes in today’s organizations are
leading more and more workers into positions where proficiency is assumed or required,
but they have not yet had the opportunity to master the skills that would allow them to
execute their roles proficiently (Corley & Schinoff, 2017). Skill acquisition is a gradual
process (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Ericsson et al., 1993). Yet, younger employees are
taking on increasingly challenging roles and responsibilities sooner than anticipated as
more and more baby boomers exit the workforce and flexible work practices such as
sabbaticals proliferate (e.g., Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics, 2019; Marr, 2012).
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Organizational instances of potential mismatches between a role’s assumed expertise and
a role occupant’s self-perceived level of expertise abound. For example, academics who
become first-time journal editors can be thought to be experiencing a mismatch (Corley
& Schinoff, 2017). Similarly, newly-promoted consultants faced with the prospect of
selling work as opposed to merely executing work can also be thought to be experiencing
a mismatch (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). As a result of these mismatches, employees
may naturally entertain thoughts such as, “I’m not as competent as other people seem to
think,” or, “Others think I have more knowledge or ability than I think I do.” In other
words, they may entertain what I call workplace impostor thoughts, or thoughts that
portend that others hold an overly positive view of one’s talent or abilities at work.
Surveys suggest that between 40% and 70% of employees have entertained impostor
thoughts at one point in their careers (Buchanan, 2006).
The prevalence of workplace impostor thoughts creates a managerial imperative
to understand how individuals who entertain these thoughts acquire the requisite role
proficiency, or, in other words, learn to master their work roles. Existing theories that
touch upon mastery and learning offer some insight into how individuals learn to master
their work roles. For example, in one of the earliest investigations of workplace learning,
Argyris and Schön (1978; 1974) outlined how the practices of single-loop learning—
whereby employees react in response to changes in their situations —and double-loop
learning—whereby employees not only react to, but also question fundamental
assumptions behind changes in their situations that may alter or add to previous
learning—lead to greater individual learning. Early theories of socialization underscored
the significance of developing workplace relationships to effectively learn how to
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proficiently execute one’s role, navigate organizational politics, and learn the
organization’s language and values (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). More recent models
of individual work-based learning build upon theories of socialization, highlighting the
important role of social, cultural and organizational factors in not only learning how to do
one’s work but also in learning who one is at work as well as how one better learns at
work (e.g., Chao et al., 1994; Ibarra, 1999; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Myers, 2018; Raelin,
1997; Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, & Quinn, 2005). For example, Myers (2018)
outlined a relational theory of vicarious learning that emphasized that individual learning
(as well as future learning behaviors) was grounded in discursive interpersonal
interactions that set the stage for the co-construction of the meaning of work experiences.
Together, these theoretical perspectives provide a fruitful foundation for
understanding the dynamics of individual learning in organizational contexts. However,
these theories offer less in terms of understanding the complexities inherent to individuals
who entertain workplace impostor thoughts, in part because they have focused more on
the process of individual learning and less on the individual who is doing the learning.
Similarly, research on workplace impostor thoughts offers little insight into the
relationship between these thoughts and mastery at work. This is because, in contrast to
the rich streams of research on individual learning and mastery at work, research on
workplace impostor thoughts remains quite nascent. Even when considering the emerging
literature on workplace impostor thoughts and its parent construct of the impostor
phenomenon, examinations have been limited to documenting its correlates and
attitudinal outcomes (For exceptions, see Badawy et al., 2018; Chapter 1). For example,
scholars have found that entertaining impostor thoughts is negatively related to job
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satisfaction (Grubb & McDowell, 2012; Vergauwe et al., 2015) as well as self-efficacy
and organizational support (McDowell et al., 2015). However, scholars have called for
more research around work-related behaviors as outcomes of interest (Vergauwe et al.,
2015).
Accordingly, I seek to develop a model of how having workplace impostor
thoughts affects how individuals master their work roles. Building on the core ideas and
concepts underlying theories of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Higgins,
1987), I outline how workplace impostor thoughts can both negatively (through increased
fear, specifically a fear of being found out) as well as positively (through increased
introjected motivation) affect mastery at work. Importantly, however, the strength with
which impostor thoughts leads to fear or motivation is likely to depend on one’s beliefs
of the state or malleability of one’s abilities. In this manner, I offer a model that
articulates not only how workplace impostor thoughts impact mastery, but also when
individuals are more likely to respond to impostor thoughts with fear or motivation, that,
in turn, affect the level of mastery achieved. I test my hypotheses in two settings: a twotime-period field study of 196 Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadets and a three-timeperiod field study of 161 individuals employed at an investment solutions company
headquartered in the Northeastern United States. As a preview to my findings, I find
general support for my hypotheses.
This investigation has important implications primarily for the literatures on
workplace impostor thoughts and job mastery. Whereas previous work on impostor
thoughts has largely depicted the phenomenon as highly detrimental (e.g., Badawy et al.,
2018; Clance & O’Toole, 1987; Grubb & McDowell, 2012; Vergauwe et al., 2015), I
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challenge this prevailing conclusion to suggest instead that such thoughts may be both a
boon and a bane, particularly when it comes to mastery at work. In doing so, I follow a
nascent, but growing, body of work that is shifting the discourse from the phenomenon’s
detriments to its potential benefits (see Chapter 1). Additionally, by examining how an
individual factor, workplace impostor thoughts, affects job mastery, I contribute to
research on individual learning at work. As noted, most existing models of learning at
work have focused on the process of learning rather than on the individual engaged in the
learning (e.g., Chao et al., 1994; Ibarra, 1999; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Myers, 2018;
Raelin, 1997; Roberts et al., 2005). Those models that do acknowledge the individual
have primarily focused on information seeking behaviors or a proactive personality (e.g.,
Ashford & Black, 1996; Ashforth, Sluss, & Saks, 2007; Morrison, 1993). Thus, by
examining the relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and job mastery, I
expand the set of individual factors typically considered, thereby extending theory on
how individuals learn at work.
DEFINING WORKPLACE IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS
The construct of workplace impostor thoughts harkens back to what is known as
the impostor phenomenon, which was introduced to the literature by academic
psychologists, Clance and Imes, in 1978. In its earliest conceptualization, the impostor
phenomenon reflected feelings and thoughts of intellectual fraudulence (Clance & Imes,
1978). Since this seminal work, definitions have proliferated. A theme across most
influential conceptualizations is the belief that others have overestimated one’s abilities
or talents (Clance & O’Toole, 1987; Harvey & Katz, 1985; Kolligan & Sternberg, 1991;
Leary et al., 2000). In organizational settings, the phenomenon reflects a self-discrepancy
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about one’s competence at work (Badawy et al., 2018; Grubb & McDowell, 2012;
McDowell et al., 2015; Vergauwe et al., 2015). As such, to better capture the
phenomenon’s cognitive underpinnings as well as its organizational frame, I adopt the
term workplace impostor thoughts, which is defined as the belief that others hold an
overly positive view of one’s abilities or competence at work, in line with what was
outlined in Chapter 1.
Workplace impostor thoughts encapsulates a positive discrepancy between two
discrepant cognitions—(1) what one thinks others think of one’s own abilities and (2)
what one thinks of one’s own abilities—with the implication that what one thinks others
think is greater than what one thinks. In this way, it reflects a specific form of cognitive
dissonance, originally defined by Festinger (1957) as holding two cognitions that are
psychologically inconsistent. Those who are high in impostor thoughts are those who
frequently think to themselves, “Other people see me more positively than my
capabilities warrant,” or, “I’m not as qualified as others think I am.” In contrast, those
who are low in impostor thoughts rarely entertain such thoughts. Recent work has shown
workplace impostor thoughts to be theoretically and empirically distinct from a number
of constructs including self-efficacy, neuroticism, and interpersonal congruence (see
Chapter 1). Importantly, individuals need not chronically experience these thoughts to be
high in impostor thoughts; rather, they may experience them at some points of time, but
not at others (see Chapter 1). As such, such thoughts may be triggered by situational
factors. For example, scholars have recently identified that facing unfamiliar role
responsibilities may be one antecedent of workplace impostor thoughts (see Chapter 1).
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IMPOSTOR THOUGHTS AS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
A central aim of this investigation is to develop a model linking workplace
impostor thoughts to mastery at work. By conceptualizing impostor thoughts as a form of
cognitive dissonance, it seems apt to begin with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger,
1957) to develop such a model. Cognitive dissonance theory begins with a simple
premise: two psychologically inconsistent cognitions engender emotional discomfort, or
negative affect, as well as a motivation to reconcile discrepant cognitions (Festinger,
1957). Whereas the core premise has exhibited remarkable staying power, scholars have
modified cognitive dissonance theory to suggest that its predictive power is most
observable when the dissonance pertains to one’s self-concept, or one’s understanding of
the self (Aronson, 1997). Indeed, the core tenets of cognitive dissonance theory have
influenced a number of subsequent theories where the role of one’s self-concept is central
including Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory, Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation
theory, Swann’s (1983) self-verification theory, and Tesser’s (1988) self-evaluation
maintenance theory. Indeed, it is because cognitive dissonance best pertains to cognitions
about one’s self-concept that makes theories rooted in cognitive dissonance particularly
apt for examining workplace impostor thoughts, which represent a self-discrepancy.
Therefore, in accordance with theories rooted in cognitive dissonance, I outline
competing pathways by which workplace impostor thoughts impact mastery at work.
Later, I consider moderators that may weaken the negative pathway of impostor thoughts
on mastery through fear or strengthen the positive pathway through motivation. See
Figure 1 for the full theoretical model.
----Insert Figure 1 Here----
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Found Out: How Workplace Impostor Thoughts Lead to a Fear of Being Found Out
Given that workplace impostor thoughts reflect a form of cognitive dissonance, I
expect that they are likely to be positively associated with fear, particularly a fear of
being found out as a fraud. Such an assertion is consistent with predictions stemming
from theories of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Higgins, 1987) in which any
discrepancy in cognitions—in this case, one’s perception of others’ views of one’s
abilities and one’s perceptions of one’s own abilities—is deemed aversive. Although
classic cognitive dissonance theory did not specify the exact nature of the felt negative
affect, associated theories of cognitive dissonance offer clarity (e.g., Higgins’s selfdiscrepancy theory). Indeed, self-discrepancies of the nature closest to impostor
thoughts—in which individuals perceive that they are less than what they think others
seem to think—are often accompanied by agitation-related emotions such as fear and
anxiety (Higgins, 1987). This is because this type of discrepancy signals that one is
failing to live up to what they think others think and expect of them. Thus, when
individuals have impostor thoughts, they are likely to experience fear, specifically a fear
of being found out as a fraud. This type of fear captures anxiety that others could validate
one’s impostor thoughts, i.e., that others could discover that they have overestimated
one’s abilities (Badawy et al., 2018; Leary et al., 2000). Concretely, manifestations of
such a fear could include thoughts like, “I’m afraid people may find out that I’m not as
capable as they think I am,” or, “I’m afraid people will realize how much knowledge I
really lack.”
Empirically, scholars have long found support for this proposed association
between impostor thoughts and a fear of being found out. For example, in initial
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qualitative examinations of the phenomenon, Clance and colleagues (Clance, 1985;
Clance & Imes, 1978; Matthews & Clance, 1985) noted that professionals across
industries who expressed impostor thoughts were also those who feared that others would
eventually discover that they were not as capable as others thought they were. Similarly,
in quantitative examinations of the phenomenon in work contexts, airport employees who
entertained impostor thoughts were more likely to report that they feared failing at work,
which would expose themselves as frauds (Neureiter & Traut-Mattausch, 2016). More
recently, researchers found that journal editors reporting impostor-like thoughts
expressed fear that others would realize they were not as good at their jobs as their role
titles would suggest: “Is someone going to say that this person is a complete moron?
They have no idea what they’re talking about. How did they get to be an AE?” (Corley &
Schinoff, 2017: 14). Put differently, these editors fretted over whether others would
question why they held their editorial roles, thereby realizing that their ascribed editor
expertise exceeded their achieved expertise. Therefore, tying together the above
theorizing, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Having workplace impostor thoughts is positively associated with a
fear of being found out as a fraud.
Psyched Up: How Workplace Impostor Thoughts Lead to Introjected Motivation
Although having workplace impostor thoughts likely invites fear, I expect that
entertaining such thoughts may also be motivational. This is because individuals are
motivated to reduce any perceived dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Indeed, as Festinger
(1957: 3) stated, any form of cognitive dissonance is “a motivating factor in its own
right.” Motivation captures the psychological process behind why an individual engages
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in a given behavior with the intensity, direction, and duration that he or she displays
(Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). Those who are high in motivation are those that approach an
activity with great vigor, focus, and resolve, while those who are low in motivation
approach an activity with apathy, aimlessness, and indecision. In addition to its level,
motivation may also differ in its type. For example, individuals may engage in their jobs
because they enjoy it—thereby exhibiting intrinsic motivation—or because they want to
get paid—thereby exhibiting extrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagne & Deci,
2005). Similarly, they may engage in their jobs because they want to fulfill a core value
or identity—thereby exhibiting identified motivation—or because they want to avoid
discomfort such as feelings of guilt or low self-esteem—thereby exhibiting introjected
motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000a; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).
Reflecting on these differing types of motivation, the type emanating from
impostor thoughts is likely to be introjected in nature. Because experiencing cognitive
dissonance is uncomfortable, motivation arising from forms of cognitive dissonance aims
to rid oneself of the associated discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Festinger, 1957). As
such, any action prompted by a form of cognitive dissonance, like impostor thoughts,
should be a product not of enjoyment or external reward. Rather, it should be contingent
on avoiding the psychologically uncomfortable nature of dissonance that one feels
intrapersonally (Elliot & Devine, 1994). The type of motivation that this description most
aptly encapsulates is that of introjected motivation, which is formally defined as engaging
in an activity because doing so mitigates the level of anxiety or fear that one feels
(Koestner & Losier, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Indeed, some empirical work lends
support for the positive association between workplace impostor thoughts and introjected
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motivation. For example, scholars have found that when individuals perceive that their
employers believe them to be higher in ability than they themselves believe, these
individuals work harder in order to avoid feeling like they are taking advantage of their
employers (Adams, 1965; Brockner et al., 1986). Based off of this theorizing and
empirical support, I therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: Having workplace impostor thoughts is positively associated with
introjected motivation.
Furthermore, because by definition, introjected motivation captures the avoidance
of agitated-related emotions like fear and anxiety, it is also likely that there is an indirect
effect of workplace impostor thoughts on introjected motivation through a fear of being
found out. In other words, fear of being found out likely plays a mediating role.
Hypothesis 3: Fear of being found out mediates the relationship between impostor
thoughts and introjected motivation such that there is an indirect effect of
workplace impostor thoughts on introjected motivation through a fear of being
found out.
Found Out and Psyched Up: The Competing Effects on Mastery at Work
I expect that introjected motivation should, in turn, be positively associated with
mastery at work. Job mastery is defined as “how well an individual masters the required
knowledge, skills, and abilities” associated with a particular work role (Chao et al., 1994:
731). As such, job mastery is conceived as a learning-oriented outcome that is thought to
promote job performance (Edmondson, Dillon, & Roloff, 2007; Singer & Edmondson,
2008). In this manner, it relates but remains distinct from performance outcomes such as
proficiency or adaptivity, which are defined as how well one “fulfills the prescribed or
predictable requirements of the role” and how well one “copes with, responds to, and
supports change” respectively (Griffin et al., 2007: 330). In fact, whether mastery leads to

100
proficiency or adaptivity depends on the particular skills and abilities learned because
different skills facilitate different performance outcomes (Singer & Edmondson, 2008).
Importantly, a key predictor of mastery is deliberate practice, which is defined as
motivated, repetition of effort directed towards a task with a specific goal (Ericsson et al.,
1993).
Introjected motivation emanating from impostor thoughts should be positively
associated with job mastery because it encourages deliberate practice. As noted, given
that workplace impostor thoughts reflect a form of cognitive dissonance, individuals high
in impostor thoughts should be motivated to engage in actions that close the perceived
gap between their own self-view of their competence and what they think are others’
views (Festinger, 1957). While there may be many ways by which individuals can
reconcile this type of self-discrepancy, Higgins (1987) theorized that in discrepancies
such as these, what one perceives that others think acts as a strong pull. This is because
not meeting the higher standards thought to be held by others cements that one has failed
to live up to what they think others think and expect of them. As such, individuals high in
impostor thoughts should look to raise their own self-views of their competence to what
they believe others think. Because others views are higher than one’s own views,
individuals are thus likely to direct their attention to activities relevant to this goal,
exhibit great energy, and prolong their effort (Bryan & Locke, 1967; LaPorte & Nath,
1976; Locke & Latham, 2002). In other words, they are likely to engage in deliberate
practice, which results in increases in their “speed, accuracy, and control” when
executing role responsibilities (Ericsson, 2008: 991). As such, the higher standard that
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others provide in workplace impostor thoughts provides the ideal conditions by which
one can develop job mastery.
Hypothesis 4: Introjected motivation is positively associated with mastery at
work.
Moreover, given that I have proposed that having impostor thoughts is positively
associated with introjected motivation (Hypothesis 2) and that introjected motivation is
positively associated with job mastery (Hypothesis 4), I further hypothesize that
introjected motivation mediates the relationship between having workplace impostor
thoughts and job mastery.
Hypothesis 5: Introjected motivation mediates the positive relationship between
having workplace impostor thoughts and mastery at work such that there is a
positive indirect effect of having impostor thoughts on mastery at work through
introjected motivation.
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive indirect effect of having impostor thoughts on
mastery at work serially through a fear of being found out and introjected
motivation.
Importantly, however, fear of being found out may serve as a countervailing force
to the positive association between introjected motivation and mastery such that there
may be a negative association between fear of being found out and mastery at work. Fear
is generally positively associated with avoidant behaviors and negatively associated with
approach behavior (Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & Edmondson, 2009; Lebel, 2017).
For example, those who are fearful are less likely to engage in self-disclosure (Ragins,
Singh, & Cornwell, 2007), less likely to persist in performing desired task behaviors
(Appelbaum, Bregman, & Moroz, 1998), less likely to speak up about issues they care
about (Milliken & Morrison, 2003), and less likely to collaborate with others (Nembhard
& Edmondson, 2006). A common thread unites each of these behaviors: Each involves
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individuals failing to allocate motivated, repeated effort either towards the tasks they face
or towards those around them. Indeed, the most prototypical avoidant behavior associated
with fear is broadly that of withdrawal of effort (Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1993; Öhman &
Mineka, 2001).
A fear of being found out is highly detrimental for job mastery for at least two
reasons. First, achieving high levels of mastery requires repeated engagement with the
tasks at hand (Ericsson et al., 1993). However, if one has withdrawn one’s efforts from
work, one has, by definition, disengaged from one’s work role (Rich et al., 2010).
Without investing one’s cognitive, emotional, and physical resources into one’s role, one
has little chance of mastering the skills associated with this role because one is neither
directing one’s attention, nor putting effort, nor displaying enthusiasm towards one’s role
(Kahn, 1990). Second, a fear of being found out not only results in role-related
withdrawal of effort, but it also entails withdrawal from those in one’s work environment
(Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). This is problematic because developing mastery at work is
likely also a product of socialization in which others encourage and support skill
development (Chao et al., 1994; Klein, Fan, & Preacher, 2006). In fact, colleagues,
subordinates and supervisors can crucially provide feedback that helps individuals learn
what behaviors are role-appropriate as well as how others will evaluate them when
performing those behaviors (Ashford & Cummings, 1983). In this manner, others can
play a critical role in paving the way towards job mastery. Yet, a fear of being found out
detrimentally impedes access to this crucial feedback, thereby negatively impacting
mastery at work.
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Empirical work offers some support for the negative association between a fear of
being found out and job mastery As an illustration, Snell (1988) interviewed 106
managers and administrators only to conclude that, to enhance learning at work, the
experience of learning in organizations needed to be accompanied less by fear and more
by pleasure. In other words, fear interfered with mastering one’s work role. Likewise, in a
study of individuals working in teams employed at furniture manufacturing company,
Edmondson (1999) found that feeling psychologically safe, i.e., not feeling afraid of
speaking up and taking risks, and thereby potentially exposing one’s incompetence, was
critical to team learning. Although this study was at the group level of analysis, its
findings were consistent with work executed at the individual level of analysis,
emphasizing the existence of this relationship at multiple levels (e.g., Argyris, 1982;
Argyris & Schon, 1978). Drawing from this work, I advance the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: Fear of being found out is negatively associated with mastery at
work.
Furthermore, because I have hypothesized that impostor thoughts are positively
associated with a fear of being found out (Hypothesis 1) and that a fear of being found
out is negatively associated with mastery at work (Hypothesis 7), it is reasonable to
propose that a fear of being found out plays a negative mediational role between impostor
thoughts and mastery that competes with the positive mediational role of introjected
motivation (Hypothesis 7).
Hypothesis 8: Fear of being found out mediates the negative relationship between
having impostor thoughts and mastery at work such that there is a negative
indirect effect of workplace impostor thoughts on mastery through a fear of being
found out.
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Found Out or Psyched Up: The Moderating Role of Helping and a Growth Mindset
What determines whether individuals will respond to their workplace impostor
thoughts with fear or motivation, thereby impacting mastery? I argue that the answer
depends on one’s beliefs of the state or malleability of one’s abilities. Recall that the
rationale for a positive relationship between having workplace impostor thoughts and a
fear of being found out is that such a discrepancy signals that one is failing to live up to
what they think others think and expect of them (Higgins, 1987). As such, an assumption
underlying this rationale is that workplace impostor thoughts call into question one’s
abilities to meet the given situational demands. Therefore, engaging in behaviors that
bolster one’s beliefs in one’s abilities, or one’s self-efficacy, is likely to disrupt the
positive relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and a fear of being found out
(Wood & Bandura, 1989). One such behavior that may be particularly relevant in
organizational contexts as work becomes more and more interdependent is helping,
which is defined as providing assistance or support to others at work (Anderson &
Williams, 1996; Grant, 2008; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998).
Helping others at work may increase one’s sense of self-efficacy for two reasons
(and thereby disrupt the positive relationship between impostor thoughts and fear). First,
helping a colleague on a work-related task gives an individual insight into the abilities of
those around them. Specifically, it provides an individual with critical social comparison
information. When asked to help, an individual is placed in a position in which he or she
can make a downward social comparison because the help-seeker has implicated him or
herself as being less capable. As such, because downward social comparisons make
individuals feel better about themselves (Gruder, 1971; Wills, 1981), being asked to help
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and engaging in providing help should raise one’s self-efficacy. Second, and relatedly,
helping others indicates to the helper that he or she is perceived by others as capable
enough to do so. Most helping exchanges in organizations are reactive in nature,
beginning with a specific request from a help-seeker (Anderson & Williams, 1996;
Burke, Weir, & Duncan, 1976). Help-seekers are likely to be selective in who they ask
for help because if they ask the wrong person, they may risk exposing themselves as
incompetent and not receive the help they need (Bohns & Flynn, 2010). Consequently,
the fact that an individual has been selected to help may indicate to him or her that a helpseeker has concluded that the benefits of asking for help outweigh potential help-seeker
embarrassment. In other words, the help-seeker believes the helper is capable enough to
help. Indeed, empirical work has shown that helping others (as opposed to not helping)
makes one feel more capable (Grant & Gino, 2010; Mogilner, Chance, & Norton, 2012).
In a series of experiments, Mogilner and colleagues (2012) found that when individuals
gave their time away, for example, in the form of helping an at-risk student edit his
college essay, they reported greater feelings of self-efficacy. As such, because helping
others makes one feel more effective, helping should moderate the positive relationship
between workplace impostor thoughts and a fear of being found out.
Hypothesis 9: Helping others moderates the positive relationship between
workplace impostor thoughts and a fear of being found out, such that the
relationship is weaker as helping others increases but stronger as helping others
decreases.
Hypothesis 10: Helping others moderates the first stage of the negative indirect
effect of workplace impostor thoughts on mastery through a fear of being found
out such that the negative indirect effect is weaker as helping others increases but
stronger as helping others decreases.
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Similarly, one’s beliefs concerning the malleability of one’s abilities, or one’s
growth mindset, may also determine how one responds to one’s workplace impostor
thoughts (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Individuals are thought to exist along a continuum
regarding beliefs around the malleability of their abilities (Dweck, 2016; Dweck &
Leggett, 1988; Good, Rattan, & Dweck, 2012). On one end of the continuum, individuals
believe intelligence or ability is fixed (known as a fixed mindset). On the other end of the
continuum, individuals believe that intelligence or ability can evolve over time (known as
a growth mindset). Since its inception, scholars have documented how a growth mindset
emerges as well as how having a growth mindset shapes important attitudinal and
behavioral outcomes (e.g., Good et al., 2012; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Rattan & Dweck,
2018). Of note, a robust line of work has emphasized the critical role that a growth
mindset plays in fostering motivation (see Carr & Dweck, 2011; Paunesku et al., 2015).
Having a growth mindset should moderate the positive relationship between
impostor thoughts and introjected motivation by strengthening this relationship. Recall
that the rationale for the positive indirect effect of impostor thoughts on mastery through
introjected motivation is that individuals are motivated to reconcile perceived selfdiscrepancies such that they meet the standards set by others (Festinger, 1957; Higgins,
1987). To best do so, requires individuals high in workplace impostor thoughts to believe
that they are capable of raising perceptions of their own abilities to those that others hold.
Put differently, the more individuals believe that their abilities are not fixed, but rather
can be shaped and honed over time, the greater should be the strength of the positive
relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation. Thus, for
those high in growth mindset, they should see workplace impostor thoughts as an
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opportunity to hone their skills, and therefore should muster greater introjected
motivation to reconcile the perceived self-discrepancy. In contrast, those low in growth
mindset (or, in other words, those who have a more fixed mindset) should see workplace
impostor thoughts as more of a threat, which should mitigate the emanating introjected
motivation.
Hypothesis 11: Having a growth mindset moderates the positive relationship
between workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation, such that the
relationship is stronger for those high in growth mindset but weaker for those low
in growth mindset.
Hypothesis 12: Having a growth mindset moderates the first stage of the positive
indirect effect of workplace impostor thoughts on mastery through introjected
motivation such that the positive indirect effect is stronger for those high in
growth mindset but weaker for those low in growth mindset.
In sum, having impostor thoughts can serve as a double-edged sword with regards
to mastery at work. On one hand, having impostor thoughts may engender a fear of being
found out, resulting in decreased job mastery; on the other hand, it also may stimulate
introjected motivation, resulting in increased job mastery. Whether the positive pathway
trumps the negative pathway depends on whether individuals help others at work—
thereby attenuating the positive association between impostor thoughts and fear—or
whether individuals hold a growth mindset— thereby strengthening the positive
relationship between impostor thoughts and motivation.
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
I tested my hypotheses using two field studies. In Study 1, which featured a
sample of Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets, I explored Hypotheses 1-3, which
concerned the first half of the model relating workplace impostor thoughts to the
mechanisms of fear of being found out and introjected motivation. In Study 2, which
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involved a sample of employees at an investment solutions firm, I explored the full
theoretical model, which included all twelve predictions hypothesized.
STUDY 1
Sample and Procedures
To test Hypotheses 1-3, I ran Study 1. Study 1 relied on two time-lagged surveys
of cadets in two branches of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)—Army and
Navy—which train college students to become commissioned officers of the United
States Military. All branches were located in the southern part of the United States.
Survey 1 captured cadets’ workplace impostor thoughts. Survey 2, nine weeks later,
captured cadets’ fear of being found out and introjected motivation. All but nine out of
276 cadets opted into Survey 1 at Time 1 (a response rate of 97%). At Time 2, 198 out of
276 cadets opted into Survey 2 (a response rate of 72%). Because not all cadets
responded to both surveys, I employed listwise deletion to handle missing data. After
doing so, 196 out of 276 cadets remained (a response rate of 71%). Seventy percent of the
final sample was male, and 51% identified as Caucasian, 33% identified as Hispanic,
23% identified as Asian-American, and 13% identified as African-American, NativeAmerican, or other. Note that 18% identified with more than one ethnicity. Their average
age was 21.2 years (SD = 3.8), and their average ROTC tenure was 1.9 years (SD = 1.0).
Measures
With the exception of the impostor thoughts construct, respondents all used a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree when
responding to the items below.
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Independent variable: Impostor thoughts (Time 1). I measured impostor
thoughts using the five items developed in Chapter 1. Respondents were presented with
the stem “At work I have thought that…” and were asked to respond using a six-point
frequency scale ranging from 1 = never to 6 = very frequently. A sample item was
“People think I am more capable than I think I am” (α = .86).
Mediating variable: Fear of being found out (Time 2). To measure fear of being
found out, I used three items adapted from scales developed by Clance (1985) and Leary
and colleagues (2000). A sample item was “Sometimes I am afraid I will be discovered
for who I really am” (α = .89).
Mediating variable: Introjected motivation (Time 2). I measured introjected
motivation using four items adapted from Ryan and Connell (1989). Respondents were
presented with the stem “Why are you motivated to do your work?” which was followed
by four items. A sample item was “Because I want to avoid looking bad” (α = .92).
Analyses and Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study
variables. As can be observed in Table 1, zero-order correlations between my variables of
interest provided initial general support for Hypotheses 1-3 of my theoretical model.
Although these correlations were meaningful, they served as preliminary analyses.
----Insert Table 1 Here---Confirmatory factor analyses. Before engaging in hypothesis testing, I examined
the discriminant validity of my measures. I loaded each item of my measures onto the
respective higher order factors of impostor thoughts, fear of being found out, and
introjected motivation (model 1). All of these latent factors were allowed to correlate.
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Furthermore, I allowed the error variances of two items in the workplace impostor
thoughts scale to correlate due to similarities in item wording. I then examined model
goodness-of-fit statistics, including the comparative fit index (CFI), the nonnormed fit
index (TLI), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMSR). CFI and TLI
values greater than 0.90 and SRMSR values less than 0.10 would indicate acceptable
model fit (Kline, 1998). As can be seen in Table 2, model 1 fit the data well
(χ2(50)=92.35, CFI=.97, TFI=.97, SRMSR= .07) and had a superior fit in comparison to
more parsimonious models. As such, I concluded that my measures demonstrated
adequate discriminant validity.
----Insert Table 2 Here---Hypothesis testing. To test Hypotheses 1-3, I used Hayes (2018) PROCESS
algorithm with a bootstrapping procedure to construct bias-corrected 95% confidence
intervals using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Specifically, I specified a model 4 in which I
estimated a direct pathway from workplace impostor thoughts to fear of being found out,
a pathway from workplace impostor thoughts to introjected motivation, and a pathway
from fear of being found out to introjected motivation. Table 3 reports results from
hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that workplace impostor thoughts would be positively
related to a fear of being found out. In support of Hypothesis 1, those high in workplace
impostor thoughts were also those who exhibited greater fear of being found out (b =
0.43, SE = 0.08, p < .001). Hypothesis 2 stated that workplace impostor thoughts would
be positively associated with introjected motivation. Although the coefficient estimated
was in the direction hypothesized, I did not find evidence of a significant direct
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relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation (b = 0.16,
SE = 0.10, n.s.). Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted that fear of being found out mediated the
relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation such that
there was an indirect effect of workplace impostor thoughts on introjected motivation. In
support of Hypothesis 3, there was a significant positive indirect effect of workplace
impostor thoughts on introjected motivation through a fear of being found out (indirect
effect = 0.17, bootstrap SE = 0.05, CI95% [0.08, 0.29]).
----Insert Table 3 Here---Discussion
The results from Study 1 provided support for Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not for
Hypothesis 2. In detail, having workplace impostor thoughts was directly associated with
a greater fear of being found out, but was only indirectly (as opposed to directly)
associated with introjected motivation. Although these findings were informative, I had
yet to test if and how these mechanisms explained the relationship between workplace
impostor thoughts and job mastery. As such, I sought to test the full model in Study 2.
STUDY 2
Sample and Procedures
To test the full model, I engaged in a multi-period, time-lagged data collection
process with employees of an investment solutions firm headquartered in the
Northeastern United States. Employees completed three surveys, which were
disseminated evenly across a four-month time period. The first survey, at Time 1,
captured the independent variable of interest, the moderator of helping, as well as control
variables including the demographics of gender and role tenure. The second survey, at
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Time 2, captured the mediating mechanisms of introjected motivation and fear of being
found out. The third survey, at Time 3, captured the dependent variable of interest, job
mastery, and the other moderator, growth mindset.
After receiving an email from the organization’s head of human resources
describing the purpose of my time-lagged study as one meant to augment findings from
the organization’s annual employee survey, 193 out of 317 employees opted into Survey
1 at Time 1 (a response rate of 61%). At Time 2, 233 out of 317 employees participated
in Survey 2 (a response rate of 74%). Finally, at Time 3, 220 out of 317 employees
completed Survey 3 (a response rate of 69%). Because not all employees responded to all
three surveys, I employed listwise deletion to handle missing data. After doing so, the
final sample consisted of 161 employees (a final response rate of 51%). Sixty-seven
percent of the final sample was male, and 91% identified as Caucasian, 5% identified as
Asian-American, and the remaining 4% identified as African-American, NativeAmerican, or other. Their average age was 36.3 years (SD = 9.8), and their average
organizational tenure was 6.3 years (SD = 6.1). Thirty-six percent classified their role as
an Analyst; 19% classified their role as a Senior Analyst; 14% classified their role as a
Manager, 3% classified their role as a Senior Manager; 12% classified their role as a
Director; and finally 16% classified their role as a Vice President or higher.
Measures
With the exception of the impostor thoughts construct, respondents all used a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree when
responding to the items below. The specific items that were used to measure each of the
constructs are listed in Appendix A.
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Independent variable: Impostor thoughts (Time 1). I measured impostor
thoughts using the same scale as in Study 1 (e.g., “At work I have thought that…People
think I am more capable than I think I am;” α = .92).
Mediating variable: Fear of being found out (Time 2). I measured fear of being
found out as in Study 1 using three items adapted from scales developed by Clance
(1985) and Leary and colleagues (2000) (e.g., “Sometimes I am afraid I will be
discovered for who I really am;” α = .97).
Mediating variable: Introjected motivation (Time 2). I measured introjected
motivation as in Study 1 using the four items adapted from Ryan and Connell (1989)
(e.g., “I am motivated to do my work…because I want to avoid looking bad;” α = .91).
Outcome variable: Job mastery (Time 3). I adapted three items developed by
Chao and colleagues (1994) and created a fourth item to measure job mastery. Sample
items included “I have mastered the required tasks of my current work role” and “I have
developed skills and abilities that allow me to successfully perform at my job” (α = .85).
Moderating variable: Helping others (Time 1). To measure helping at work, I
used four items from Van Dyne and LePine (1998). A sample item was “I help orient
new colleagues at work” (α = .82).
Moderating variable: Growth mindset (Time 3). To measure growth mindset, I
adapted three items from De Castella and Byrne (2015) as well as Dweck (1999). A
sample item was “With enough time and effort I think I could significantly improve my
level of competence at work” (α = .82).
Control variables (Time 1). When determining which control variables to include
in my analyses, I statistically accounted for factors that were likely correlated with my

114
independent variable of interest, impostor thoughts, as well as with my dependent
variable of interest, mastery at work. For example, I controlled for gender as scholars
have suggested that women may be more likely to entertain impostor thoughts (Clance &
Imes, 1978; Jöstl, Bergsmann, Lüftenegger, Schober, & Spiel, 2015) and may exhibit
decreased mastery at work due to gender differences in the opportunities afforded to men
and women (Ohlott, Ruderman, & McCauley, 1994). Similarly, I controlled for role
tenure as those new to their roles are likely to experience impostor thoughts (Kolligan &
Sternberg, 1991) as well as exhibit decreased mastery at work as it takes time to develop
the skills necessary to be proficient at work (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Ericsson et al.,
1993).
Analyses and Results
Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study
variables. As can be seen in Table 4, the zero-order correlations provided initial general
support for my theoretical model. For example, the construct of impostor thoughts was
significantly positively related with a fear of being found out (r=.43, p <.001) as well as
introjected motivation (r=.21, p <.01). Fear of being found out was negatively associated
with mastery at work (r=.23, p <.01). However, introjected motivation was not
significantly correlated with mastery at work (r=.11, n.s.). Of note, my hypothesized
control variables did not correlate significantly with my independent variable as well as
my dependent variable of interest. As such, there was the possibility that my control
variables were potentially “impotent” controls (Becker et al., 2016). Because the lack of
significant correlations conflicted with the aforementioned conceptual rationales for their
inclusion (see Becker et al., 2016 for a full discussion of statistical control), I report
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analyses without my control variables below. Importantly, however, the pattern of results
remained the same regardless of the inclusion of these controls. Estimates for the most
part differed by no more than a tenth of a point.
----Insert Table 4 Here---Confirmatory factor analyses. As is customary, I next assessed discriminant
validity by loading each of the scale items onto their respective higher-order factor
(workplace impostor thoughts, fear of being found out, introjected motivation, job
mastery, helping, and growth mindset). I then the examined goodness-of-fit statistics, As
can be seen in Table 5, model 1 fit the data well (χ2(215)= 323.81, CFI=.96, TFI=.95,
SRMSR= .06). Furthermore, model 1had a superior fit to any of the 15 other alternative
models that involved various combinations of collapsing items across constructs. Thus,
given adequate model fit, I deemed it appropriate to next examine the hypothesized
relationships.
----Insert Table 5 Here---Hypothesis testing. I first examined the direct and mediating effects for impostor
thoughts on the mechanisms hypothesized (Hypotheses 1-8) before assessing moderating
effects (Hypotheses 9-12). To do so, I used Hayes (2018) PROCESS algorithm with a
bootstrapping procedure to construct bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals using
10,000 bootstrap samples. Specifically, I specified a customized model 4 in which I
estimated a direct pathway from workplace impostor thoughts to the parallel mediators of
fear of being found out and introjected motivation, which in turn had direct pathways to
job mastery. I also included a direct pathway from fear of being found out to introjected
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motivation in line with the hypothesized model. Table 6 reports the results from
hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that workplace impostor thoughts would be positively
related to a fear of being found out. In support of Hypothesis 1, those high in workplace
impostor thoughts were also those who exhibited greater fear of being found out (b =
0.47, SE = 0.08, p < .001). Hypothesis 2 stated that workplace impostor thoughts would
be positively associated with introjected motivation. Although the coefficient estimated
was positive, I did not find evidence of a significant direct relationship between
workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation (b = 0.19, SE = 0.14, n.s.).
Hypothesis 3 predicted that a fear of being found out mediated the relationship between
workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation such that there was an indirect
effect of workplace impostor thoughts on introjected motivation. In support of
Hypothesis 3, there was a significant positive indirect effect of workplace impostor
thoughts on introjected motivation through a fear of being found out (indirect effect =
0.02, bootstrap SE = 0.07, CI95% [0.04, 0.31]).
Hypothesis 4 posited that there would be a positive relationship between
introjected motivation and job mastery. In support of Hypothesis 4, those who were
higher in introjected motivation were also those who reported higher levels of job
mastery (b = 0.08, SE = 0.04, p < .05). In contrast to what was predicted in Hypothesis 5,
however, I did not find a significant positive indirect effect of workplace impostor
thoughts on job mastery through introjected motivation given that the confidence interval
included zero (indirect effect = 0.16, bootstrap SE = 0.15, CI95% [-0.01, 0.05]). In support
of Hypothesis 6, there was a significant positive indirect effect of workplace impostor
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thoughts on job mastery serially through a fear of being found out and introjected
motivation (indirect effect = 0.01, bootstrap SE = 0.08, CI95% [0.0004, 0.03]). Hypothesis
7 put forth that there would be a negative relationship between a fear of being found out
and job mastery. In support of Hypothesis 7, those who had a greater fear of being found
out were also those who reported lower levels of job mastery (b = -0.19, SE = 0.06, p <
.001). Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 8, there was a negative indirect effect of
workplace impostor thoughts on mastery through a fear of being found out (indirect
effect = -0.09, bootstrap SE = 0.03, CI95% [-0.15, -0.04]).
----Insert Table 6 Here---Moderating effects. I next examined the moderating effects posed in Hypotheses
9-12. To do so, I similarly used Hayes (2018) PROCESS algorithm with a bootstrapping
procedure to construct bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals using 10,000 bootstrap
samples. However, instead of specifying a customized model 4, I specified a customized
model 10, which supplemented the customized model 4 with the two moderating paths
specified in Hypotheses 9-12. Table 7 reports the results from testing these moderating
hypotheses.
----Insert Table 7 Here---Hypothesis 9 suggested that helping others would moderate the positive
relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and a fear of being found out, such
that the relationship would be weaker as helping others increased but stronger as helping
others decreased. In support of Hypothesis 9, I found a significant negative interaction
effect (b = -0.18, SE = 0.09, p < .05). As can be seen in Figure 2, as helping others
increased, the simple effect of impostor thoughts on fear of being found out got weaker.
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For individuals low in helping (– 1 SD), having impostor thoughts was significantly
positively related to a fear of being found out (simple effect = 0.60, SE = 0.10, t = 5.87, p
<.001). For individuals high in helping (+ 1 SD), having impostor thoughts was more
weakly positively related to a fear of being found out, as observed by the decrease in the
magnitude of the effect (simple effect = 0.29, SE = 0.11, t = 2.55, p <.05). Furthermore,
in support of Hypothesis 10, helping others moderated the first stage of the negative
indirect effect of workplace impostor thoughts on mastery through a fear of being found
out such that the relationship was weaker as helping others increased but stronger as
helping others decreased (index of moderated mediation = 0.04, bootstrap SE = 0.02,
CI95% [0.001, 0.09]).
----Insert Figure 2 Here---Hypothesis 11 posited that having a growth mindset would moderate the positive
relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and introjected motivation such that
the relationship would be stronger for those high in growth mindset but weaker for those
low in growth mindset. In support of Hypothesis 11, I found a significant positive
interaction effect (b =.25, SE = 0.12, p < .05). As can be seen in Figure 3, for individuals
low in growth mindset (– 1 SD), having impostor thoughts was not significantly related
to introjected motivation (simple effect = -0.20, SE = 0.22, t = -0.88, n.s.). For individuals
high in growth mindset (+ 1 SD), having impostor thoughts was significantly positively
related to introjected motivation (simple effect = 0.38, SE = 0.17, t = 2.16, p < .05).
Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 11, having a growth mindset moderated the first
stage of the positive indirect effect of workplace impostor thoughts on mastery through
introjected motivation such that the positive indirect effect was stronger for those high in
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growth mindset but weaker for those low in growth mindset (index of moderated
mediation = 0.02, bootstrap SE = 0.01, CI95% [0.0005, 0.05]).
----Insert Figure 3 Here---Discussion
The results of Study 2 replicated and built upon the results of Study 1. As in
Study 1, I found that having workplace impostor thoughts was positively associated with
a fear of being found out and that impostor thoughts had a positive indirect effect on
introjected motivation through a fear of being found out. These pathways provided the
foundation for assessing how such thoughts impacted job mastery. Extending the results
of Study 1, I found that these pathways competed such that workplace impostor thoughts
had a significant negative indirect effect on job mastery through a fear of being found
out, but a positive indirect effect on job mastery serially through a fear of being found out
and introjected motivation. In contrast to what I expected, however, I did not find
evidence of a third pathway, specifically an unconditional positive indirect effect of
workplace impostor thoughts on job mastery through introjected motivation. However, I
did find support for a conditional indirect effect. In detail, I found that the positive
indirect effect of workplace impostor thoughts on job mastery may be accessible only for
those high in growth mindset. Because I did not find a main effect of impostor thoughts
on introjected motivation, this result is suggestive that the effects of workplace impostor
thoughts may be opposite in direction for those high and low in growth mindset. Indeed,
the effect was positive and significant for those high in growth mindset, but negative
(albeit insignificant) for those low in growth mindset.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The importance of job mastery for one’s career is well established. Those who
have mastered their work roles garner benefits for both themselves as well as for those
organizations of which they are a part (Chao et al., 1994; Helmreich et al., 1980;
Reichers, 1987; Simosi, 2010; Wood & Bandura, 1989). Yet, changes in today’s
organizations threaten its development among employees. This is because the rate by
which employees are advancing in their careers is accelerating while skill acquisition
remains a gradual process (Corley & Schinoff, 2017; Ericsson et al., 1993). As a result,
employees may increasingly find themselves in roles in which they may think that they
do not have the abilities to meet the high levels of proficiency expected. In other words,
they may more frequently entertain workplace impostor thoughts—thinking that others
perceive that they have more talent or ability than they think they do. Indeed, as many as
70% of employees have claimed to have entertained such thoughts (Buchanan, 2006).
Accordingly, I aimed to develop and test a model of how workplace impostor thoughts
influenced mastery at work. I conclude by discussing how my results contribute to
research on workplace impostor thoughts as well as to research on individual learning at
work.
Implications for Research on Impostor Thoughts
The results of this investigation primarily advance research on workplace
impostor thoughts. The preponderance of research on this phenomenon portrays the
experience of workplace impostor thoughts as particularly harmful (e.g., Badawy et al.,
2018; Clance & O’Toole, 1987; Grubb & McDowell, 2012; Vergauwe et al., 2015). My
findings both uphold and challenge this prevailing wisdom. In support of the prevailing
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wisdom, I find that, because having impostor thoughts triggers a fear of being found out,
having such thoughts is detrimental for achieving job mastery. However, in opposition to
the prevailing wisdom, I find evidence for not just one, but two pathways by which
impostor thoughts can positively influence job mastery. Indeed, fear emanating from
workplace impostor thoughts need not be as harmful as the aforementioned negative
pathway suggests. Having impostor thoughts can result in higher levels of job mastery
because fear also triggers introjected motivation, which in turn positively impacts job
mastery. Similarly, another pathway by which workplace impostor thoughts positively
influences job mastery can be observed through introjected motivation. However, this
positive indirect effect is only available to those high, not low, in growth mindset. In
other words, this second positive pathway was conditional on having a growth mindset.
Additionally, I not only articulated the contrasting ways by which impostor
thoughts impacted job mastery, but I also identified when these various ways were likely
to manifest. Specifically, I found two factors that, when present, could make observing a
positive relationship between impostor thoughts and job mastery more likely. First, as
noted, I found that having a growth mindset seemed to strengthen the positive indirect
effect of impostor thoughts on job mastery such that those high in growth mindset were
better able to harness the benefits of workplace impostor thoughts. Second, I found that
helping others seemed to weaken the negative direct effect of impostor thoughts on a fear
of being found out such that those who aided their colleagues were better able to shield
themselves from the detriments of workplace impostor thoughts. Taken together, these
results suggest that individuals high in impostor thoughts need not act as passive victims
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to their thoughts. Individuals high in impostor thoughts can act proactively by adopting a
growth mindset or helping others in order to unlock higher levels of job mastery.
Furthermore, my analysis of the mechanisms by which workplace impostor
thoughts influence job mastery uncovers how workplace impostor thoughts may be both a
bane and a boon. In line with what is predicted by theories of cognitive dissonance (e.g.,
Festinger, 1957; Higgins, 1987), individuals cannot entertain impostor thoughts without
simultaneously experiencing fear as well as motivation. The two are intimately
intertwined such that not only do they operate in parallel, but they also operate serially.
This illuminates a fundamental tension underlying workplace impostor thoughts:
precisely because of the fear induced, such thoughts may compel one to reach greater
heights or to retreat into one’s greatest depths. Moreover, identification of these
mechanisms broadens our understanding of how workplace impostor thoughts affect
important workplace outcomes such as job mastery. Although scholars have issued calls
for greater research within organizational settings (Vergauwe et al., 2015), the number of
workplace outcomes studied in relation to workplace impostor thoughts are few (for
exceptions, see Badawy et al., 2018; Chapter 1). Because the number of workplace
outcomes considered is narrow, research on the mechanisms by which workplace
impostor thoughts influence such outcomes is even more limited. This work, thus,
advances our understanding of not just how workplace impostor thoughts impact job
mastery, but also articulates through what mechanisms such thoughts do so. Indeed,
having workplace impostor thoughts can be seen as a double-edged sword, inspiring both
fear and motivation.
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Implications for Research on Individual Learning at Work
The results of this investigation also inform work on individual learning within
organizations. Scholars have made significant headway in articulating models of learning
in complex, relationally interdependent organizations—the types of work organizations
that increasingly characterize today’s landscape (Argote, Ingram, Levine, & Moreland,
2000; Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003; Ashforth et al., 2007; Myers, 2018). Much of
the focus of these models centers on either the behaviors that may take place during
interactions among colleagues such as observation and imitation or on the nature of the
relationships characterizing colleagues (e.g., Bresman, 2013; Gioia & Manz, 1985;
Myers, 2018). Where many of these models stop short is around how these interactions
may also simultaneously inspire cognitions about one’s abilities that may help or hinder
individual learning at work. I delve further into the cognitive micro-processes that
undergird the process of learning at work by developing a model of how workplace
impostor thoughts—a set of cognitions regarding one’s abilities that incorporates one’s
views and others’ views—influence a key learning outcome, job mastery. In other words,
I argue that it is not only through observing and interacting with others that one comes to
learn, as previously shown by other scholars; it is also through one’s own sense making
of feedback regarding one’s abilities that one is encouraged, or discouraged, to master
one’s work role.
Moreover, this research shines a light on not only the process of learning—which
is the dominant focus of most learning models (e.g., Chao et al., 1994; Ibarra, 1999; Lave
& Wenger, 1991; Myers, 2018; Raelin, 1997; Roberts et al., 2005)—but also on the
individual doing the learning. Theory and empirical work tout constructs such as a
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proactive personality and information seeking behaviors as critical individual-level
factors that positively influence an employee’s acquisition of knowledge (Ashforth et al.,
2007; Bauer, Bodner, Erdogan, Truxillo, & Tucker, 2007). It follows, then, that failing to
engage in proactive behaviors like feedback seeking and information seeking should
hinder learning at work. As such, one may conclude that proactivity is an advantage
whereas passivity is a disadvantage for unlocking mastery. Although such a conclusion
would be accurate, individual factors are not always easily classified as proactive or
passive. Indeed, workplace impostor thoughts is one such factor. Thus, without
consideration of factors like workplace impostor thoughts, we potentially miss out on the
opportunity to further understand the complex and nuanced myriad of mechanisms that
characterize the relationship between less classifiable factors like workplace impostor
thoughts and learning or mastery at work.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with any investigation, this work is not without limitations. First, my findings
stem from two time-lagged survey studies in which all measures were obtained from the
same source—the cadet or employee, depending on the study. As such, it is possible that
associations between variables were inflated due to common-method/common-source
bias (Ostroff et al., 2002; Podsakoff et al., 2003). This bias was likely mitigated by the
time-lagged nature of the studies; nonetheless, future scholars should incorporate
additional sources of data, particularly with regards to the outcome of interest. For
example, it would be fruitful to understand whether supervisors corroborate self-reports
of mastery, and whether these reports translate to higher performance ratings.
Furthermore, I qualify my findings by highlighting that causality remains an open issue.
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Although I expected that mastery would be a consequence of a fear of being found out as
well as introjected motivation, and that these two mechanisms, in turn, would be a
consequence of workplace impostor thoughts—reflected in my temporal ordering of the
independent, mediating, and dependent variables—I acknowledge that this approach does
not necessarily eliminate questions of causality. As such, to firmly establish causality, I
look to future scholars to incorporate experimental designs when further probing the
concept of workplace impostor thoughts.
CONCLUSION
This paper set out to develop a model of how workplace impostor thoughts
influence job mastery. Across two field studies involving ROTC cadets and employees at
an investment solutions firm, I found evidence for a myriad of pathways—sometimes
competing—that define the complicated relationship between the two constructs. Taken
together, my results suggest that having workplace impostor thoughts may be both a
boon—inspiring introjected motivation— and a bane—engendering a fear of being found
out—for mastery at work.
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 1
Variables

Mean S.D.

1

2

1

Workplace
impostor
thoughts

2.96

1.20

---

2

Fear of being
found out

2.60

1.41

0.37***

---

3

Introjected
motivation

3.98

1.73

0.23**

0.36***

3

---

Note. n = 196; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)

TABLE 2
Confirmatory Factor Analyses for Study 1
Model

Detail

χ2

df

CFI

TLI

SRMR

Δχ2(df)

1

Three factors

92.35

50

0.97

0.97

0.07

---

2

Two factors; impostor thoughts and
fear of being found out combined

323.27

52

0.83

0.79

0.15

230.92(2)

3

Two factors; impostor thoughts and
introjected motivation combined

393.98

52

0.79

0.73

0.19

301.63(2)

4

Two factors; fear of being found out
and introjected motivation combined

609.52

52

0.65

0.56

0.17

517.17(2)

Note. n = 196; CFI and TLI values greater than 0.90 and SRMSR values less than 0.10 would indicate acceptable model fit
(Kline, 1998). Model with best fit in bold. All χ2 and Δχ22 values are p < .001. Δχ2 tests relative to model 1.
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TABLE 3
Hypothesis Testing for Study 1
Dependent Variable
Fear of Being Found Out
Variables

Introjected Motivation

b

s.e.

t

b

s.e.

t

Intercept

1.31

0.25

5.26***

2.49

0.33

7.58***

Workplace impostor
thoughts

0.43

0.08

5.52***

0.16

0.10

1.53

---

---

---

0.40

0.09

4.49***

Fear of being found out
R2

0.14***

0.14***

F (df)

30.48 (1,194)

15.92 (2,193)

Δ R2

0.14***

0.14***

Note. n = 196; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed). Bolded statistics show hypotheses.
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TABLE 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 2
Variables

Mean S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Workplace
impostor
thoughts

2.04

0.95

---

1

2

Fear of being
found out

1.95

1.05

0.43***

---

3

Introjected
motivation

3.77

1.60

0.21**

0.26**

---

4

Job mastery

5.76

0.73

-0.09

-0.23**

0.11

---

5

Helping

5.79

0.84

-0.07

-0.21**

-0.08

0.27**

---

6 Growth mindset

5.41

1.06

0.09

0.00

0.18*

0.23**

0.05

---

7

Female

0.34

0.47

0.05

0.13

-0.01

-0.13

0.07

-0.16*

---

8

Role tenure

4.34

4.94

0.04

-0.02

-0.04

0.00

-0.03

-0.18*

0.002

8

---

Note. n = 161; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed); Female is binary with 1=female and 0=male.
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TABLE 5
Confirmatory Factor Analyses for Study 2
Model

Detail

χ2

df

CFI

TLI

SRMR

Δχ2(df)

1

Six factors

323.81

215

0.96

0.95

0.06

---

2

Five factors; impostor thoughts and fear of being
found out combined

901.62

220

0.75

0.71

0.11

577.81(5)

3

Five factors; impostor thoughts and introjected
motivation combined

751.69

220

0.80

.78

0.12

427.88(5)

4

Five factors; impostor thoughts and helping
combined

608.92

220

0.86

0.84

0.11

285.11(5)

Five factors; impostor thoughts and growth mindset
596.57
combined

220

0.86

0.84

0.11

272.76(5)

723.74

220

0.82

0.79

0.13

399.93(5)

Five factors; fear of being found out and introjected
739.89
motivation combined

220

0.81

0.78

0.12

416.08(5)

5
6
7

Five factors; impostor thoughts and mastery
combined

8

Five factors; fear of being found out and helping
combined

588.92

220

0.86

0.84

0.11

265.11(5)

9

Five factors; fear of being found out and growth
mindset combined

599.56

220

0.86

0.84

0.11

275.75(5)
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10

Five factors; fear of being found out and mastery
combined

699.70

220

0.82

0.80

0.12

375.89(5)

11

Five factors; introjected motivation and helping
combined

604.74

220

0.86

0.84

0.12

280.93(5)

12

Five factors; introjected motivation and growth
mindset combined

581.77

220

0.87

0.85

0.10

257.96(5)

13

Five factors; introjected motivation and mastery
combined

715.91

220

0.82

0.79

0.13

392.10(5)

Five factors; helping and growth mindset combined 599.08

220

0.86

0.84

0.11

275.27(5)

14
15

Five factors; helping and mastery combined

574.33

220

0.87

0.85

0.10

250.52(5)

16

Five factors; growth mindset and mastery
combined

553.44

220

0.88

0.86

0.09

229.63(5)

Note. n = 161; CFI and TLI values greater than 0.90 and SRMSR values less than 0.10 would indicate acceptable model fit
(Kline, 1998). Model with best fit in bold. All χ2 and Δχ22 values are p < .001. Δχ2 tests relative to model 1.
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TABLE 6
Hypothesis Testing for Study 2
Dependent Variables
Fear of Being Found Out
Variables
Intercept
Workplace impostor
thoughts
Fear of being found out
Introjected motivation

Introjected Motivation

Job Mastery

b

s.e.

t

b

s.e.

t

b

s.e.

t

0.99

0.18

5.52***

2.73

0.32

8.63***

5.83

0.16

36.65***

0.47

0.08

5.96***

0.19

0.14

1.36

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.33

0.13

2.54*

-0.19

0.06

-3.53***

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.08

0.04

2.28*

0.18***

0.08**

0.08**

F (df)

35.55 (1,159)

6.88 (2,158)

7.21 (2,158)

Δ R2

0.18***

0.08**

0.08**

R2

Note. n = 161; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed)
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TABLE 7
Hypothesis Testing for Moderators of Study 2
Dependent Variable
Fear of Being Found Out

Introjected Motivation

Variables

b

s.e.

t

b

s.e.

t

Intercept

0.07

1.18

0.06

3.97

1.42

2.78**

Workplace impostor
thoughts

1.51

0.50

3.02**

-1.18

0.67

-1.78†

Fear of being found out

---

---

---

0.33

0.13

2.59*

Helping

0.16

0.20

0.80

---

---

---

---

---

---

-0.22

0.26

-0.84

0.25

0.12

2.07*

Workplace impostor
thoughts X Helping

-0.18

0.09

-2.13*

Growth mindset

---

---

---

Workplace impostor
thoughts X Growth mindset

---

---

---

Growth mindset

0.24***

0.13***

F (df)

16.21 (3,157)

5.99 (4,156)

0.10***

0.07**

2

ΔR

Note. n = 161; †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (2-tailed); Δ R2 is calculated from relevant regressions in
Table 6.
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FIGURE 1
Theoretical Framework Illustrating the Double-Edged Nature of Workplace Impostor Thoughts on Mastery at Work

−
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FIGURE 2
Helping as a Moderator of the Relationship between Workplace Impostor Thoughts
and Fear of Being Found Out

FIGURE 3
Growth Mindset as a Moderator of the Relationship between Workplace Impostor
Thoughts and Introjected Motivation
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APPENDIX A: SCALE ITEMS
Impostor Thoughts
(from Chapter 1)
How often have you had the following thoughts in the past ___ months?
1. People important to me think I am more capable than I think I am.
2. Others think I have more knowledge or ability than I think I do.
3. Other people see me more positively than my capabilities warrant.
4. I have received greater recognition from others than I merit.
5. I am not as qualified as others think I am.
Fear of Being Found Out
(from Clance, 1985 and Leary, Patton, Orlando, and Wagoner Funk, 2000)
1. Sometimes I am afraid I will be discovered for who I really am.
2. I’m afraid people important to me may find out that I’m not as capable as they
think I am.
3. Sometimes I’m afraid others will discover how much knowledge or ability I really
lack.
Introjected Motivation
(from Ryan and Connell, 1989)
Why are you motivated to do your work?
1. Because I want to avoid feeling guilty
2. Because I’ll feel bad about myself if I don’t
3. Because I want to avoid looking bad
4. Because I’ll feel ashamed if I don’t
Mastery at Work
(Items 1-3 from Chao, O’Leary-Kelly, Wolf, Klein, & Gardner, 1994; fourth item
inductively-derived)
1. I have learned how to perform at my job in an even better manner.
2. I have mastered the required tasks of my current work role.
3. I have developed skills and abilities that allow me to successfully perform at my
job.
4. I have become more proficient at my job.
Helping
(from Van Dyne and LePine, 1998)
1. I volunteer to assist others with their work-related responsibilities.
2. I help orient new colleagues at work.
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3. I assist others at work with their tasks.
4. I help others at work with their responsibilities.

Growth Mindset
(from De Castella and Byrne, 2015)
1. With enough time and effort I think I could significantly improve my level of
competence at work.
2. I believe I can always substantially improve my competence at work.
3. I believe I have the ability to change my level of competence at work
considerably over time.
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CONCLUSION
AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this dissertation, I articulated a parsimonious, non-tautological definition of
workplace impostor thoughts, developed a psychometrically valid measure, and outlined
how workplace impostor thoughts influence critical workplace outcomes such as
performance and mastery at work. In doing so, I challenged the predominant view that
entertaining workplace impostor thoughts is uniformly harmful—a perhaps welcome
challenge in light of the phenomenon’s prevalence in organizational contexts (Buchanan,
2006). As a result of this effort, I set the stage for rigorous future research on the
phenomenon. I conclude by outlining a number of promising lines for future inquiry, in
the hopes of encouraging more organizational scholars to attend to and advance research
on this phenomenon.
The Impact of Others’ Characteristics for Theory on Workplace Impostor Thoughts
By defining workplace impostor thoughts as a form of cognitive dissonance that
incorporates what one thinks of one’s abilities and what one thinks others think of one’s
abilities, I have highlighted how others are of central importance to the phenomenon. Yet,
in my investigations, I was largely agnostic to the characteristics that defined these
others. Because individuals privilege feedback from those who they deem important and
discount feedback from those who they deem inconsequential (Jungermann & Fischer,
2005), implicit in the definition of workplace impostor thoughts is that these others are
likely high status. However, future research could benefit from explicit, rather than
implicit, consideration of others’ characteristics.
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In fact, there may be reason to believe that others’ characteristics may influence
how workplace impostor thoughts manifest or affect critical workplace outcomes. For
example, others’ demographics characteristics may attenuate the extent with which
individuals entertain impostor thoughts. This is because research has shown that
individuals are more likely to dismiss feedback—regardless of valence—from
demographically dissimilar others (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Roberson,
Deitch, Brief, & Block, 2003). Thus, if employees are members of demographically
diverse organizations, they may be less likely to entertain workplace impostor thoughts
simply because they may not closely attend to what they think others think of their
abilities. Similarly, interacting with those who are demographically dissimilar may alter
the interpersonal consequences of workplace impostor thoughts. For example, in Chapter
1, I theorized and found evidence that there was a positive relationship between
workplace impostor thoughts and interpersonal performance such that those who were
high, as opposed to low, in impostor thoughts were also seen by others as higher in
interpersonal skills. In theorizing this relationship, I did not consider how characteristics
of the individual with whom an individual high in impostor thoughts interacts may
influence this relationship. One could imagine that this relationship may be attenuated if
one is interacting with a demographically dissimilar other. Indeed, a long line of research
has shown that interactions with demographically dissimilar others are fraught with
conflict and poor communication (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998). As such, the negative factors that unfortunately often color such
interactions may counteract individuals’ theorized displays of greater warmth that in turn
lead to higher ratings of interpersonal performance.
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The Role of Time in Theorizing on Workplace Impostor Thoughts
Understanding how the passage of time impacts workplace impostor thoughts
may be a second fruitful avenue of inquiry. By identifying that a situational factor—
facing unfamiliar role responsibilities—is likely to prompt workplace impostor thoughts,
I implicated the role of time: Individuals may not chronically entertain impostor thoughts.
As such, the strength of the construct’s relationships with work-related outcomes may
evolve over time (Mitchell & James, 2001). In fact, in Chapter 1, I suggested that the
mixed findings regarding the relationship between impostor thoughts and task
performance could be due to differences in the passage of time between when the
independent and dependent variables were measured in the two studies. In Chapter 2, I
put forth that the impact of impostor thoughts on mastery could only be detected if one
takes into account the competing mechanisms that may only be observed with time.
Therefore, better specification of the role of time in building theory around workplace
impostor thoughts could both offer greater precision to the theoretical models I developed
as well as provide a platform to build more dynamic theories of workplace impostor
thoughts. As an illustration, given that developing mastery is a process, it would be
interesting to follow employees with differing frequencies of impostor thoughts as they
engage in this process. Do those high in impostor thoughts display steep learning curves,
or is learning more discontinuous as they harness their anxiety for motivation, similar to
what may occur with defensive pessimists (Norem & Cantor, 1986)?
Consideration of Additional Workplace Outcomes: Creativity and Turnover
Although this dissertation mapped out how workplace impostor thoughts impact
performance and job mastery, this dissertation only scratches the surface in terms of the
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multitude of relationships that may exist between workplace impostor thoughts and other
important workplace outcomes. Therefore, a third fruitful avenue involves considering a
broader set of workplace outcomes. Two workplace outcomes that come to mind are that
of creativity and turnover. Creativity is defined as the production of ideas that are both
novel and useful (Amabile, 1988). Coming up with both novel and useful ideas requires
cognitive flexibility, or an ability to engage with complex thoughts (Amabile, 1988;
Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Berg, 2014). Because workplace impostor
thoughts involve entertaining conflicting cognitions, it is possible that those high in such
thoughts may be predisposed to the cognitive flexibility required for creativity. As such,
there may be a positive relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and individual
creativity. Likewise, just as workplace impostor thoughts may be associated with
creativity, such thoughts may also be related to turnover intentions. Because workplace
impostor thoughts is associated with a fear of being found out as outlined in Chapter 2,
individuals may rather wish to exit their work roles than find themselves in a position
where they may feel like their lack of competence will be exposed. Interestingly,
however, whether individuals high in impostor thoughts actually turnover may be up for
debate. This is because scholars have found a weak or inconsistent relationship between
turnover intentions and turnover behaviors (Allen, Weeks, & Moffitt, 2005). Therefore,
those high in impostor thoughts may be high in turnover intentions but low in actual
turnover because turnover is extremely uncertain and risky (Allen et al., 2005),
potentially placing those high in impostor thoughts in more precarious positions that they
may believe they are already in.
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Probing Causality
Moreover, as noted in both Chapters 1 and 2, causality remains an open question
across the investigations of this dissertation. To truly probe causality, laboratory
examinations of the phenomenon are required. This may be a difficult feat as workplace
impostor thoughts may be hard to activate in a laboratory setting. Whereas a number of
avenues may be available for manipulating impostor thoughts—a false feedback
paradigm, critical recall, etc.—it is less clear how successful such manipulations will be
because laboratory settings are low on mundane realism (Carlsmith, Ellsworth, &
Aronson, 1976), which may be necessary for impostor thoughts given that one’s identity
at work is strongly implicated in the phenomenon. One promising avenue might be
through a combination of manipulations that explicitly manipulates as well as implicitly
manipulates workplace impostor thoughts. For example, in an experimental study of
workplace impostor thoughts and creativity, participants could be randomly given
feedback that makes them believe they are not as capable as others think they are after
completing a creativity task. Then, as a way to reinforce the manipulation, participants
could complete a modified implicit association test (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, &
Banaji, 2009). The workplace impostor thoughts IAT could implicitly manipulate (and
reinforce the explicit manipulation of) workplace impostor thoughts by pairing “self” and
“others” words with positively- or negatively-valenced ability words. Those in the high
workplace impostor thoughts condition would be instructed to pair positive ability words
with others and negative ability words with the self, whereas those in the low workplace
impostor thoughts condition would be instructed to pair neutral words of various
categories with the self and others. In spite of the controversies surrounding the IAT (e.g.,
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Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; Rothermund &
Wentura, 2004), the test has had remarkable staying power. Importantly, in the proposed
scenario described above, the IAT would not be used to assess bias, which is from where
a great deal of the controversy stems (Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock,
2013).
Identifying the Source of Error
In defining workplace impostor thoughts, I suggested that the source of error
existed within the individual entertaining impostor thoughts (see page 12). In other
words, an individual who entertains impostor thoughts perceives a discrepancy,
regardless of whether an actual discrepancy exists. Perceiving a discrepancy can be a
product of many different factors. For example, an individual can think that he or she is
less capable than others think and be correct such that his or her actual ability is indeed
lower than what others perceive. Alternatively, an individual can think that he or she is
less capable than others think and be incorrect such that others perceive the individual’s
ability accurately. Finally, an individual can think that he or she is less capable than
others think and be incorrect such that his or her actual ability is somewhere between
what he or she thinks and what others think. In this final scenario, others, like the
individual, inaccurately assess the individual’s abilities. Importantly, in this dissertation, I
did not specify which of these three scenarios was captured by workplace impostor
thoughts. However, one can imagine that each of these differing scenarios may carry
critical theoretical implications worth explicit consideration. For example, the positive
pathways are unlikely to play out if indeed an individual’s abilities are accurately
assessed by the individual as being lower than what other people expect. This is because
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effort / motivation, while important and helpful, is not likely to be a substitute for raw
talent.
Thus, given that this dissertation sheds light on the unexpected bright sides of
impostor thoughts, implied in this dissertation from a theoretical perspective, is that the
individual who entertains impostor thoughts misperceives his or her level of ability such
that actual ability is higher than what he or she thinks. What this means, then, is that
workplace impostor thoughts, as depicted in this dissertation, pertains to those who not
only have some high level of skill or ability, but also who have some level of uncertainty
around their own level of abilities. Therefore, the individual entertaining impostor
thoughts serves as one source of error. The extent to which others err, however, is less
clear. Indeed, I am largely agnostic to the magnitude, if any, by which others err in
assessing an individual’s abilities. Whereas the magnitude should not influence the
frequency of workplace impostor thoughts—which is the construct examined in this
dissertation—it should carry implications for the intensity of workplace impostor
thoughts, which may, in turn, influence critical workplace outcomes. In fact, one might
imagine that a more complete treatment of workplace impostor thoughts is one that
organizes the construct along two dimensions: frequency and intensity. Therefore, future
researchers might consider the interplay between these two dimensions. For example,
high frequency, but low intensity, may offer a way to reap the benefits of impostor
thoughts without the costs as the anxiety produced may not be all-consuming.
The Importance of Context
Finally, I took great care in circumscribing my phenomenon to the organizational
context. As such, careful examination of factors central to today’s workplaces in relation
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to workplace impostor thoughts is merited. For example, implicit in my arguments—
particularly in the relationship between workplace impostor thoughts and interpersonal
performance—is that the benefits of impostor thoughts may be observed among
individuals who hold pluralistic roles, or roles in which high performance can be
achieved by excelling on varying dimensions. For example, to be a good doctor, an
individual should aspire for high technical skill (e.g., correct diagnoses and treatment
plans) as well as a strong bedside manner. While excelling on one dimension does not
necessarily substitute for another dimension, this multiplicity of dimensions provides
those with impostor thoughts flexibility in their responses. Other factors characterizing
today’s workplaces that could influence either the frequency with which individuals have
impostor thoughts or the ways in which individuals respond to their thoughts may also
include existing power and status structures (Hogg & Terry, 2000), the degree of
interdependence (Myers, 2018), and the differing relationships that exist between
employers and employees (Barley et al., 2017; Heaphy et al., 2018).
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Having workplace impostor thoughts may be far from rare. Yet, research on this
phenomenon has been stymied theoretically, phenomenologically, and empirically. This
dissertation advances and redirects research on this phenomenon by introducing the
construct of workplace impostor thoughts to the literatures of management and
organizational behavior. Across the chapters of this dissertation, I not only defined
workplace impostor thoughts and developed a psychometrically valid measure, but I also
outlined how such thoughts influenced important workplace outcomes. Whereas the
prevailing view portrays impostor thoughts as highly detrimental, I show that the
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phenomenon may not be as pernicious as previously depicted. In fact, there may even be
bright sides to having workplace impostor thoughts. This effort therefore serves as a
platform upon which future scholars can advance research that questions the normative
assumptions that have thus far colored work on this phenomenon.
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